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EXTRADITION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
WHEN NATIONS MUST REFUSE TO EXTRADITE A PERSON
CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 1994, O.J. Simpson disappeared for several hours with his
passport and with several thousand dollars.' He had been charged with
double murder by the State of California, offenses that made him eligible for
the death penalty.2 Although there are disputes about the motivations behind
his disappearance which will likely be explored at his criminal trial, his brief
disappearance raised some interesting questions: If he had fled to a State that
had abolished capital punishment, say the Netherlands, would the Nether-
lands honor a United States extradition request and return him to face the
death penalty? What if he fled to other States, like the United Kingdom, or
Canada, that had abolished capital punishment for all non-military related
offenses? Would he receive protection from the death penalty in one State
but not in another? Does it matter that he is black and was charged with
cross-racial killings? What, if any, treaties or international agreements limit
the States' discretion to extradite, and what are the limits of the discretion
when the death penalty is involved? This comment attempts to answer those
questions.
Some human rights treaties prohibit extradition when it is foreseeable
that the death penalty will be imposed in the State that is requesting
extradition.3 Some prohibit States from extraditing persons when it is
foreseeable that those persons will face the death penalty in the State
requesting extradition, such that the imposition of the sentence amounts to
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,4 although there is
a lack of uniformity over what treatment meets this definition.5 This
comment discusses the substantive and procedural rights that emanate from
these human rights treaties afforded to persons in extradition proceedings.
This comment also discusses new substantive and procedural rights that have
arisen by implication to all persons in deportation or expulsion proceedings
1. Henry Weinstein and Andrea Ford, Delay of Trial and Bail Denied for Simpson, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, at Al (quoting Marcia Clark, Los Angeles County Deputy District
Attorney, in her oral argument to the court opposing Mr. Simpson's motion to be released on
bail).
2. Simpson was charged with murdering Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman
in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187(a). State of California v. O.J. Simpson, Case No.
BA097211, Felony Complaint for Arrest Warrant, Counts One and Two, June 17, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News library, Hottop file. These criminal offenses made him eligible for
the death penalty under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3). Id.
3. See infra notes 42, 102-08, 160-62 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 42-45, 50-52, 175-84 and accompanying text.
5. See infra part IV. B.
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in States that are parties to specific human rights treaties.
Part II discusses the general obligations that are imposed on States by
their extradition treaties and international agreements. That part of the
comment explains the discretionary powers that are typically available to a
State that enable it to either refuse to extradite a person if the death penalty
will be imposed on that person in the State that is requesting extradition or,
in the alternative, condition the surrender of the person upon the receipt of
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed. The emergence of the
abolition of the death penalty as a treaty-based human right, and the
relevance of this human right in extradition decisions is also discussed.
Part III evaluates several decisions of courts and organizations that have
interpreted significant human rights treaties. The first subdivision of part III
evaluates Soering v. United Kingdom,6 a seminal decision by the European
Court of Human Rights7 that articulated new substantive and procedural
rights to persons in extradition proceedings; rights that emanate from a
European human rights treaty.8 The second subdivision of part III evaluates
several decisions by the United Nations Human Rights Committee that
effectively adopted significant aspects of the Soering decision by incorporat-
ing new substantive and procedural rights into the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.' These rights are afforded to persons in
extradition proceedings and other persons unlawfully within the territory of
a State that is a party to that treaty.
Part IV discusses the anticipated evolution of the law in this area.
Specifically, the first subdivision of part IV evaluates the similarities of the
decisions discussed in this comment and anticipates additional substantive
rights that will be extended to persons in extradition proceedings. The
remaining two subdivisions of part IV evaluate the merits of disputes that are
likely to arise in national courts and treaty-based organizations that will arise
out of extradition proceedings when the United States is requesting a person
for the prosecution of a capital crime. The second subdivision analyzes the
likelihood that many States will refuse to unconditionally honor an extradition
request from United States because the person will possibly experience
"death-row-phenomenon," a term that describes the prolonged anguish
suffered while in post-conviction detention. The third subdivision analyzes
the likelihood that one or more States will refuse to unconditionally honor an
extradition request from United States due to the apparently racially disparate
sentencing practices in the United States.
6. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 11 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 439 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
7. The European Court of Human Rights was established by the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See discussion infra note 49.
8. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
done at Rome, on Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York, on Dec. 19,
1966, 58 Fed. Reg. 45934 (1993), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Part V discusses the probable implications the implementation of the
existing and anticipated substantive rights will have on State relations.
Finally, this comment concludes that present and prospective extradition
obligations create foreign relations incentives for States to accede to human
rights treaties which obligate signatory States to abolish the death penalty.
II. EXTRADITION TREATIES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
New developments in human rights treaty law make extradition a
violation of those treaties when certain circumstances exist. The international
"law of extradition"' 0 is derived from a network of treaties, national laws,
and State diplomatic practice which differ in detail but form a common
pattern of law and procedure." Extradition is not required by customary
international law, and many States do not extradite except as bound to do so
by treaty.'2 In the absence of an extradition treaty, States can theoretically
extradite with unlimited discretion and lawfully achieve arbitrary results. For
example, in the absence of a treaty, a State could not breach any international
obligations if an extradition decision is based solely on the State's political
motivation or is based on a summary or non-existent inquiry into the merits
of the extradition request.
By operating within the terms of an extradition treaty, the requesting
State 3 accepts the risk that the harboring State may, in its discretion, refuse
to extradite and accepts the risk that the harboring State may, in its
discretion, condition the extradition upon some act by the requesting State.
The risk that the requesting State undertakes when it submits an extradition
request is acceptable partially because extradition agreements place specifical-
ly enumerated limits on the harboring State's discretion to refuse the
request."' Extradition agreements also limit the harboring State's discretion
to impose conditions upon the honoring of the request. '" In the absence of
10. Extradition is the "surrender by one state or country to another of an individual accused
or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 cmt. a (1987).
12. Id.
13. The term "requesting State" is used in this article to describe the State requesting
custody of a person for criminal prosecution, and "harboring State" is used to describe the State
that has custody of the person.
14. Some of these exceptions arise as defenses to extradition. Examples include the political
offense exception, offenses of a military character, offenses of a fiscal character, doublejeopardy, applicability of a statute of limitations, extinction of the cause of action by amnesty
or pardon, and immunity from prosecution. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United States Model, in
2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 413-17 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1986).
15. For example, the U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition enables a harboring State to seek
assurances from the requesting State in only two sets of circumstances. First, that instrument
allows a harboring State discretion to condition the surrender of a person upon the receipt of
sufficient assurances from the requesting State that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if
imposed, will not be carried out. The second condition, elaborated in footnote 12 of the treaty,
3
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compelling circumstances, 6 States usually accept the risk of an adverse
response and attempt to gain jurisdiction over fugitives through the operation
of their extradition treaties.
While most extradition treaties are bilateral, multilateral treaty conven-
tions have recently emerged. 7 Other limitations guiding a State's discretion
to expel aliens include multilateral refugee conventions, 8 regional human
rights conventions, 9 and thematic human rights instruments. 20
International human rights law is derived from a network of United
Nations resolutions, multilateral treaties, decisions of treaty-based organiza-
tions, and customary international law. Treaty-based human rights
organizations2' have played an important role in imposing new limits on
States' discretion to extradite persons to other States. These controls have
been imposed in the absence of explicit discretionary limits in the respective
extradition treaties. This "incorporation" of "the law of extradition" into
these treaties largely originated from decisions of treaty-based organizations
where individual petitioners exercised their rights under the respective treaty
and protocol provisions to petition those organizations for relief from
allows States to apply the same restriction to the imposition of a life, or indeterminate, sentence.
Model Treaty on Extradition, adopted Dec. 14, 1990, art. 4(d), G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1407, 1412 (1991). See
infra note 40.
16. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992) (the United States
kidnapped a Mexican citizen from Mexico to obtain jurisdiction for charges of murdering a
United States law enforcement agent who was murdered in Mexico); United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (the United States military invaded Panama to obtain
jurisdiction over Panamanian General Manuel Antonio Noriega for federal drug charges); Helen
Silving, In re Eichman: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L. 307, 311-12 (1961)
(Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichman was abducted from Argentina to stand trial in Israel).
17. Model Treaty on Extradition, adopted Dec. 14, 1990, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1407 (1991); Inter-American
Convention on Extradition, done at Caracas, on Feb. 25, 1981, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/36
(SEPF), Pan-Am. T.S. 60, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981); European Convention on
Extradition, done at Paris, on Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
18. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, art. 31, 360
U.N.T.S. 130, 150-51; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
19. American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jos6, on Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 151 (Freedom of Movement and Residence), Protocol (No. IV) to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, art.
4, Europ. T.S. No. 46 ("Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.").
20. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, done at New York, on Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, reprinted
in 1984 U.N.Y.B. 813, 814, U.N. Sales No. E.87.I.1; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, done at New York, on Dec. 19, 1966, art. 13, 58 Fed. Reg. 45934, 45938
(1993), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176.
21. A treaty-based human rights organization is an organization expressly established by the
language of a treaty. Treaties elaborate on the powers and functions of the treaty-based
organizations. Treaty-based human rights organizations commonly assist States to give effect
to the respective treaties and function as enforcement mechanisms by providing oversight over
the State's implementation of the rights embodied in the treaties.
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victimization.'
Few extradition treaties have been drafted that expressly prohibit
extradition in circumstances where the fugitive would be executed in the
requesting State. Instead, contemporary treaties usually give the harboring
State the ability to exercise discretion to seek, as a condition for extradition,
assurances from the requesting State that the death penalty will not be
executed .3
To understand the evolution of extradition law as a component of human
rights law, it is necessary to discuss the world trend toward abolishing the
death penalty. South American States were generally the first States to
abolish capital punishment. Venezuela abolished the death penalty in 1867,
followed by Costa Rica (1882), Brazil (1889), and Ecuador (1897). 4
Panama has never had the death penalty since its independence in 1903.8
With few exceptions,' Europe practiced the death penalty with vigor until
the aftermath of World War II. For example, Germany's Peoples Court
alone executed 4,951 people in a three year period during World War I.27
Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany emerged as leaders in the
international trend toward abolition in the aftermath of World War II2I
22. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989); Kindler v. Canada, Communication No.
470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993 (U.N. Human Rights Committee), reprinted in 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993); Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Views adopted on Nov. 5, 1993). See also infra note 112 (explaining
the right to petition to the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
23. E.g., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K, art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230, infra
note 58 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K Extradition Treaty]; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can.,
art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989, infra note 111 [hereinafter U.S.-Can. Extradition Treaty]. See also
treaties cited supra note 39.
24. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (1993).
25. Id.
26. Portugal abolished the death penalty in 1867 and the Netherlands abolished the death
penalty in 1870. Id.
27. INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 143 (Deborah
Lucas Schnider trans., 1991). The People's Court established by the National Socialist
government had jurisdiction to prosecute treason and lesser internal security crimes. Id. at 140-
42. The figure of 4,951 does not include those persons sentenced to lesser sentences but who
were summarily executed by the Gestapo once in Gestapo prisons. Id. at 175-78. Cf.
V. R. Berghahn, The Judges Made Good Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, §7 (Book Review),
at 3 (estimating that Germany's judges ordered the execution of 80,000 persons in Germany and
its occupied territories during the National Socialist's twelve year period of constitutional
governance).
28. Italy introduced a resolution in the United Nations Third Committee (Social,
Humanitarian, and Cultural) which, if ratified, would have resulted in a General Assembly
resolution calling for the worldwide abolition of the death penalty by the year 2000. United
Nations Package, Friday Highlights, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. The resolution was defeated because Singapore amended it with
a provision that stressed cultural diversity. U.N. Panel Defeats Resolution on Capital
Punishment, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Dec. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. Italy and other sponsors defeated the resolution because they viewed the
amendment to be a denial of the universality of this and other human rights. Id.
Germany played an active role in drafting the protocol to the European Convention which
5
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The abolition of the death penalty has recently emerged as a treaty-based
obligation of international human rights law.29 As of the end of 1993, 47%
of all countries (i.e., ninety countries) have abolished capital punishment de
facto or de jure, or have limited its application to certain military offens-
es. 30 Although Western Europe and most of the Western Hemisphere have
abolished the death penalty,3' the United States of America remains a
retentionist 32 country.
An early expression of the special treatment afforded to the death penalty
in extradition proceedings was included in the 1935 Harvard Law School
Draft Extradition Treaty. It provided: A requested State may make the
extradition of any person conditional upon the receipt of satisfactory
assurance that, in case of conviction, neither the death penalty, nor any cruel
or unusual punishment, will be imposed upon him by the requesting State. 33
By 1957, Western Europe had incorporated the uniqueness of capital
punishment in the continent's model extradition law. This uniqueness was
manifested in the European Convention on Extradition, 3' which reserved to
member States the option of refusing to extradite under certain circumstanc-
es. Article 11 provided:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by
death under the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such
offence the death-penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested
Party or is not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the
requesting party gives such assurance as the requested party considers
sufficient that le death-penalty will not be carried out.35
This article was narrower in scope than the Harvard Draft Convention
provides for the abolition of the death penalty. SCHABAS, supra note 24, at 228-38.
29. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty,
approved by the O.A.S. General Assembly on June 8, 1990, Pan-Am. T.S. 73, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1447 (1990) [hereinafter ACHR Protocol] (entered into force Aug. 28, 1991); Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming At The
Abolition Of The Death Penalty, adopted on Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990) [hereinafter Second
Optional Protocol] (entered into force July 11, 1991); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention For The
Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms Concerning The Abolition of the Death
Penalty, done at Strasbourg, on Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538
(1983) [hereinafter Protocol No. 6] (entered into force Mar. 1, 1985).
30. Fifty-three countries have abolished the death penalty for all offenses and sixteen for all
but exceptional offenses, such as wartime offenses. Twenty-one countries and territories have
not executed anyone for at least ten years. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994, 23 (1994).
31. David Mazie, Death Penalty Remains Alive Around the World, Arousing Strong
Passions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at A2 (quoting Amnesty International).
32. The term "retentionist" is used in this article to describe a State that continues to impose
and execute death sentences.
33. Harvard Law School Draft Extradition Treaty, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 30 (Supp. 1935).
34. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 17.
35. Id., art. 11, 359 U.N.T.S. at 282.
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on Extradition because the European Convention on Extradition's article did
not contain language that allowed the harboring State to refuse an extradition
request in the absence of assurances from the requesting State that the person
would not be subject to cruel or unusual punishment. This may have been
omitted because all of the prospective parties to the Convention on Extra-
dition were to be or were already parties to the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-
vention).3 6 The European Convention provided in article 3 that "[no] one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."3 ' However, the European Convention did not prohibit capital
punishment.3" Thus, the Convention on Extradition partially filled the void
left by the European Convention.
Many bilateral treaties adopted provisions similar to article 11 of the
European Convention on Extradition in the years following the drafting of
that convention.39 Ultimately a similar provision was included in the 1991
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on a Model Treaty on
Extradition.'
Consonant with the South American abolition movement, the Inter-
American treaty system has usually taken a more aggressive posture against
capital punishment.4 ' This aggressiveness was manifested in the 1981 Inter-
American Convention on Extradition, which unconditionally prohibits the
extradition of a person when the person will be punished "by the death
penalty, by life imprisonment, or by degrading punishment" in the requesting
36. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 8.
37. Id., art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
38. Id., art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, provides, "Everyone's right to life shall be
protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence by a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law"
(emphasis added).
39. E.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 8, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065; U.S.-
U.K Extradition Treaty, supra note 23, art. IV, reprinted in infra note 58; U.S.-Can. Extradition
Treaty, supra note 23, art. 6, reprinted in infra note 111; Extradition Treaty, Jan. 21, 1971,
U.S.-Arg., art. 8, 23 U.S.T. 3501, 3511; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr.,
art. VII, 14 U.S.T. 1707, 1710; Extradition Treaty, Jan. 13, 1962, U.S.-Braz., art. VI, 15
U.S.T. 2093, 2102. See also 135 Cong. Rec. 26128-29 (1989) (listing twenty U.S. extradition
treaties with similar provisions).
40. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 17, art. 4(d), 30 I.L.M. at 1412, provides as
an optional ground for refusing extradition: "If the offence for which extradition is requested
carries the death penalty under the law of the requesting State, unless the state gives such
assurance as the requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed
or, if imposed, will not be carried out." Footnote 12 at the end of this paragraph provides:
"Some countries may wish to apply the same restriction to the imposition of a life, or
indeterminate, sentence."
41. See American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jos6, on Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 4(2)(3), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 145, which provide in part, "[tihe application of [capital]
punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply," and "[tihe
death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it."
7
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State.42
The Inter-American Convention on Extradition's prohibition of degrading
punishment presaged the coverage provided later in the 1984 United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.43 The Torture Convention obligates State Parties
to refrain from extraditing a person to a requesting State when there exist
substantial grounds for believing that the person is in danger of being
subjected to torture." However, the definition of torture excepted the "pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc-
tions. "'
In a related vein, protection from the death penalty was implicitly
excluded from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention")' because the convention's object and
purpose was to protect persons fleeing persecution, not prosecution.47 More
pointedly, in the event that a bona fide refugee had been convicted of a
42. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, supra note 17, art. 9, 20 I.L.M. at 724,
provides:
The States Parties shall not grant extradition when the offense in question is
punishable in the requesting State by the death penalty, by life imprisonment, or by
degrading punishment, unless the requested State has previously obtained from the
requesting State, through the diplomatic channel, sufficient assurances that none of
the above-mentioned penalties will be imposed on the person sought or that, if such
penalties are imposed, they will not be enforced.
43. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, done at New York, on Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/46, reprinted in 1984
U.N.Y.B. 813, U.N. Sales No. E.87.I.1 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (entered into force
on June 26, 1987).
44. Id., art. 3, 1984 U.N.Y.B. at 814, provides:
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including,
where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant, or mass violations of human rights.
45. Id., art. 1(1), 1984 U.N.Y.B. at 814.
46. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. See
art. l(F)(b), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156, providing that the terms of the Refugee Convention will not
apply to a person when there are serious reasons to consider that "he has committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee." See also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 36, U.N. Doc.
HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter "REFUGEEHANDBOOK"] (para. 155) (defining a "serious" crime
as a capital crime or a very grave punishable act).
47. See REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 15 (para. 56), which provides "[i]t should
be recalled that a refugee is a victim-or potential victim-of injustice, not a fugitive from
justice."
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particularly serious crime in the State of refuge, the Refugee Convention
allows that State to expel the refugee in its discretion even if that person's
life would be threatened as a consequence of expulsion. 4s
III. NEW SOURCES OF CONTROL ON A STATE'S
DISCRETION TO EXTRADITE
A. The European Court of Human Rights
On July 9, 1989, the European Court of Human Rights 9 altered the
landscape of global extradition law. In Soering v. United Kingdom,"° the
Court unanimously held that a State Party's decision to extradite could, if
implemented, give rise to a breach of article 3 of the European Convention,
which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.5'
This was remarkable because the relevant text of the European Convention
48. Refugee Convention, supra note 46, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152-54 (Definition
Of The Term "Refugee"). The term refugee applies to any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... is unwilling to return
to it.
Id. art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176 (Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement")),
provides:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
49. The European Court of Human Rights was established by the European Convention.
The Court's purpose is to "ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the
[signatory States]." European Convention, supra note 8, art. 19(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the
European Convention which the State Parties or the European Commission of Human Rights
refers to it. Id., art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246. If a State Party has consented to article 25 of
the European Convention, then the Commission may receive petitions from any person within
the jurisdiction of that State. Id., art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. The Commission may refer
the matter to the European Court, but typically does not do so until the Commission has
published a decision or a friendly settlement between the parties. Id., arts. 28(b), 31, 48, 213
U.N.T.S. at 238-44.
50. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989) (para. 111). See
generally, Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991).
51. European Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
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is silent on extradition. 2
Jens Soering was wanted by the United States for charges of capital
murder.5 3 Soering, a West German national, and his Canadian girlfriend
fled from Virginia to the United Kingdom soon after the girlfriend's
Virginian parents were found murdered in 1985.1 Both were arrested in
the United Kingdom the next year in connection with "cheque fraud."55
Based partially on Soering's admission of guilt which included evidence of
premeditation, a Virginia grand jury indicted him for capital murder.56 In
August 1986, the United States requested Soering's extradition under the
terms of the bilateral Extradition Treaty of 1972. 51 This treaty enables the
harboring State to condition the extradition on the assurances that the death
penalty will not be imposed in the requesting State if the harboring State does
not provide for the death penalty in a similar case.5" By the time the United
States requested Soering's extradition, the United Kingdom had abolished the
death penalty for all but certain military offenses.19
The United Kingdom's Secretary of State instituted extradition proceed-
ings against Soering and requested the United States to assure that Soering
would not face the death penalty.' The Virginia county attorney replied
by merely certifying that a representation would be made to the sentencing
judge that the United Kingdom wished that the death penalty would not be
imposed or carried out. 61
At the time of the murder, Soering was eighteen years of age62 and two
United Kingdom psychiatrists were of the opinion that he suffered from a
52. Id. The European Convention is not wholly silent on extradition, since extradition is
articulated as a permissible object of lawful arrest or detention. Id., art. 5(1)(f), 213 U.N.T.S.
at 226.
53. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at4 (para. 11).
54. Id. (paras. 11, 12).
55. Id. (para. 12).
56. Id. (para. 13).
57. Id. (para. 14); U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 23, 28 U.S.T. at 235 (granting
extradition for murder).
58. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 23, art. IV, 28 U.S.T. at 230, provides:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under
the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party
does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested party that
the death penalty will not be carried out.
59. Lillich, supra note 50, at 129.
60. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (paras. 14, 15).
61. Id. at 6 (para. 20) (Mr. Updike's sworn affidavit in his capacity as Attorney for Bedford
County certified "that should Jens Soering be convicted of the offence of capital murder as
charged in Bedford County, Virginia ... a representation will be made in the name of the
United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed or carried out.")
62. Id. at 4 (para. 12).
[Vol. 25
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mental condition known as folie d deux.63  However, Soering's age and
mental condition in this instance would not, as a matter of law, have
prohibited Soering's execution in the United States.'
West Germany took an interest in the proceedings due to Soering's West
German citizenship.' After the United States requested extradition, West
Germany filed non-capital murder charges against Soering and requested his
extradition from the United Kingdom.' The United Kingdom chose to
grant the American request partially because West Germany lacked the
subpoena power to establish sufficient evidence for a conviction of an
admitted murderer.67
The United Kingdom's Secretary of State indicated satisfaction with the
Virginia assurances by signing the warrant for Soering's surrender to the
United States authorities.6 8 Soering appealed this warrant directly to the
European Commission on Human Rights69 without challenging the warrant
in British courts.70 The United Kingdom stayed the surrender of Soering
pending resolution of the matter.7'
The European Court of Human Rights determined that the extradition of
Soering to the United States would expose him to a real risk of treatment
63. "Folie d deux" is a psychiatric syndrome, or abnormality of mind, where the person
loses their identity and acts on the suggestion of another. The person's culpability for his or her
actions are diminished but are not eliminated. "Folie A deux" is recognized in the United
Kingdom to be a defense of "not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter." Id. at 6
(para. 21). The psychiatrists concluded that Soering suffered from this condition at the time of
the murder and that he acted on the suggestion of his psychotic girlfriend. Id.
64. The week before the European Court of Human Rights issued the Soering decision, the
United States Supreme Court held in two decisions that it was Constitutionally permissible to
execute persons for crimes committed while at the age of sixteen or while mentally retarded but
not "insane." Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (June 29, 1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (June 29, 1989).
65. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (paras. 16, 17).
66. Id. (para. 16).
67. Id. at 5-6 (paras. 16, 19). Germany could not establish a prima facie case for their
anticipated proceedings if it were based solely on the strength of Soering's admission. Id. (para.
16). Another possible motivation for honoring the United States' request was to alleviate strains
in the U.S.-U.K. relationship caused by publicity over U.K. extradition requests for suspected
terrorists affiliated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). One commentator has concluded that
Soering was a "disaster" for the United Kingdom because the case's publicity impeded the
U.K.'s diplomatic efforts to extradite IRA suspects from the United States. Robertson,
Extradition, Inhuman Treatment and the Death Penalty, 154 JUST. PEACE 231, 232 (1990),
reprinted in Lillich, supra note 50, at 143.
68. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (para. 24).
69. The European Commission on Human Rights is an intermediate body which may receive
petitions from individuals and may refer those petitions to the European Court of Human Rights.
See discussion supra note 49.
70. Id. at 8 (para. 24), 23 (para. 76). The failure to challenge the warrant may have been
a failure to exhaust local remedies and could therefore have rendered the complaint inadmissible
by the European Commission or the European Court of Human Rights. The complaint may have
been admissible because the British Courts did not have jurisdiction to stay Soering's surrender
even if he had challenged the warrant. Id. at 11 (para. 35).
71. Id. at 8 (para. 24).
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going beyond the threshold set by article 3. 2  Specifically, the violative
treatment that Soering would be subjected to was "death-row-phenomenon."
Death-row-phenomenon is a highly controversial73 doctrine that describes
the prolonged mental suffering and anguish that a sentenced prisoner expe-
riences while awaiting execution (six to eight years in Soering's case).74
Since the Court's holding was both aggressive and unanimous, it was
necessarily compromised and narrow. In holding that a breach of article 3
could occur if extradition were carried out, the grounds for the Court's
decision rested on the existence of all of the following: (1) Soering's age
and (2) mental state at the time of the offense; (3) that Soering would spend
six to eight years in post-sentence detention in harsh conditions with con-
comitant mental anguish; (4) that the legitimate purposes of extradition can
be achieved by other means;75 (5) the interest of all States in bringing fugi-
tive offenders to justice; and (6) the recognition that a State's becoming a
safe-haven to fugitives is a threat to the receiving nation and tends to
undermine the foundations of extradition.7 6 The importance of including all
the elements to reach a unanimous decision of a breach was underscored by
the concurring opinion of Judge de Mayer, who, while joining in the Court's
finding of a breach, dissented on the latter two factors of the Court's ra-
tionale because they left "too much room for unacceptable infringements of
the fundamental rights of persons whose extradition is sought."'
One of the striking elements of the Court's decision was the way it
incorporated the law of extradition into article 3. In finding an "inherent
obligation not to extradite," the Court observed that it would be incompatible
with the
underlying values of the Convention, that 'common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law' to which the preamble
refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to
another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.7"
72. Id. at 35 (para. 111).
73. See discussion infra part IV. B.
74. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (para. 56).
75. The means the Court probably meant were West Germany's alternative proceedings in
which the death penalty would not be imposed and the possibility of sending Soering to the
United States after obtaining satisfactory assurances from the United States' prosecutors or
diplomats that the death penalty would not be imposed.
76. Id. at 27 (para. 89), 35 (para. 111).
77. Id. at 41-42 (de Mayer, J., concurring). Judge de Mayer was of the opinion that
"[wlhen a person's right to life is involved, no requested State can be entitled to allow a
requesting State to do what the requested State is not itself allowed to do." Id. Judge de Mayer
determined that if a State's domestic law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the
crime concerned, the State may not put the person in a position to receive the death penalty by
the hands of another State. Id.
78. Id. at 26 (para. 88). The language the European Court employed is nearly identical to
the text of the Torture Convention's article 3, paragraph 1 (supra note 44).
[Vol. 25
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Since the express language of the European Convention is silent on
extradition, it can be argued that the United Kingdom never consented to
have its extradition considerations subjected to any restriction arising from
that convention. This is especially apparent in light of the United
Kingdom's ratification of the Torture Convention, which expressly imposes
a control on State discretion in extradition considerations;7 9 through its
ratification of the Refugee Convention, which imposes express controls on
a State's discretion to expel members of a specifically defined class of
persons (i.e., "refugees");' through its non-signing of the European
Convention on Extradition, which imposes express controls on a State's
discretion in extradition considerations; 8' and (arguably) through its non-
signing of Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention, which expressly
prohibits a State from implementing the death penalty and imposes implicit
controls on a State's discretion in extradition considerations.' The Court
cited no evidence of the United Kingdom's extradition practice nor opinio
juris that supported a finding that the United Kingdom had, by customary
international law, obligated itself to refuse to extradite under any circum-
stances.
The Court justified its expansion of the European Convention by noting
that interpretations of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European
Convention had to be consistent with the "general spirit of the Convention,
an instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a
democratic society."83 The Court discussed the importance of article 3
protections by noting that they were non-derogable 4 in times of war or
other national emergency and were thus enshrined as one of the "fundamental
values of the democratic societies making up the Counsel of Europe. "I It
also noted that the right was found in other instruments in similar terms and
was generally recognized as an international standard.'
While it is significant that article 3 protections are held in high regard
and possess a universal quality, those factors do not appear to substantiate or
justify the Court's interpretation of the European Convention. The Court's
79. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
81. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 17.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 99-108.
83. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (para. 87) (referring to Kjeldsen, Busk
Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 711, (para. 53)). Cf. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding," (discussing the different treatment that must be afforded a
constitution as compared to legislation)).
84. A non-derogable right is a right that cannot be violated by a State when there is a public
emergency which threatens the life of the State. See, e.g., American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 41, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152; Covenant, supra note 9, art. 4, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; European Convention, supra note 8, art. 15, 213
U.N.T.S. at 232.
85. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (para. 88).
86. Id.
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incorporation of extradition law into the European Convention was an
extremely bold assertion of power, especially when an alternative instru-
ment, the Torture Convention, was expressly applicable and binding on the
United Kingdom.'
Also noteworthy was the Court's finding that a breach would occur if
Soering were to be exposed to death-row-phenomenon as opposed to death
by electrocution, which was the means of execution that Soering would have
faced in Virginia." The record did not reveal whether evidence was
presented to the Court or Commission of the suffering that may be experi-
enced through death by electrocution. However, evidence was available
because there had been a widely publicized execution in Alabama in which
the decedent received three charges of 1900 volts over the span of nine
minutes. At one point, smoke and flames erupted from his temple and
leg. 9  The Court simply concluded that the Virginia scheme had been
judicially determined to not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.'
The Court evaluated the death-row-phenomenon claim and not the
electrocution methodology ostensibly because the former claim had not been
considered by the United States Supreme Court9' and the latter claim had
87. Torture Convention, supra note 43, art. 3, reprinted in supra note 44 (prohibiting
extradition of a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture). The United Kingdom ratified the Torture Convention
without qualification on December 8, 1988. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS As AT 31 DECEMBER 1993 at 180, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/12, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.11 (1994).
88. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (para. 48).
89. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA: THE DEATH PENALTY 15 (1986) (referring to the
execution of John Louis Evans); Triple Jeopardy, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1983, at A22 (the
Governor refused Evans' lawyer's plea to halt the proceedings after the second charge of
electricity). See also Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-88 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
Witnesses routinely report that, when the switch is thrown, the condemned prisoner
"cringes," "leaps," and "'fights the straps with amazing strength.'" "The hands turn
red, then white, and the cords of the neck stand out like steel bands." The prisoner's
limbs, fingers, toes, and face are severely contorted. The force of the electrical
current is so powerful that the prisoner's eyeballs sometimes pop out and "rest on
[his] cheeks." The prisoner often defecates, urinates, and vomits blood and drool.
"The body turns bright red as its temperature rises," and the prisoner's "flesh
swells and his skin stretches to the point of breaking." Sometimes the prisoner
catches on fire, particularly "if [he] perspires excessively." Witnesses hear a loud
and sustained sound "like bacon frying," and "the sickly sweet smell of burning
flesh" permeates the chamber. This "smell of frying human flesh in the immediate
neighbourhood of the chair is sometimes bad enough to nauseate even the Press
representatives who are present." In the meantime, the prisoner almost literally
boils: "the temperature in the brain itself approaches the boiling point of water," and
when the postelectrocution autopsy is performed "the liver is so hot that doctors have
said that it cannot be touched by the human hand." The body frequently is badly
burned and disfigured. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
90. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (para. 48) (referring to Stamper v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 260 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980)).
91. Id. at 17 (para. 56).
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been rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 2 However, the death-
row-phenomenon claim was rejected in the United States several years
before93 and has been part of the debate in the American judiciary for over
one hundred years.' One possible explanation for the Court's choice to
focus on the death-row-phenomenon claim instead of the electrocution claim
is that the Court purposely chose a characteristic that was common to all
American executions, lengthy post conviction detention. If so, the Court
probably suspected that this characteristic was unlikely to be modified prior
to abolition in the United States.
Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument
in Soering that the death penalty was a breach per se of the article 2 right to
life. 95 It noted that most State Parties had generally abolished the death
penalty by law or by practice since the European Convention went into
effect. It reasoned, however, that article 2, paragraph 1, recognized the
legality of the death penalty and that the State Parties chose to obligate
themselves to abolition by drafting and acceding to Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention96 and not through the interpretations of the Court or
Commission.' Accordingly, the right to life provision in the European
Convention did not bar Soering's extradition.9"
Protocol Number 6 provides for the non-derogable 9 abolition of the
92. Id. at 15 (para. 48).
93. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 925, reh'g denied,
361 U.S. 941 (1960).
94. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J.) ("[Miental pain
is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of
pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition
of sentence and the actual infliction of death"); Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)(Miller, J.) ("[W]hen a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary
awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it... as to the precise time
when his execution shall take place"). Compare with Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219,
221 n.4 (1968) (eight years between arrest and sentencing was not unconstitutional where the
delay resulted from the need to assure careful review of an unusually complex case); Andrews
v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cit. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 919, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988) (accepting the petitioners' argument
would be a "mockery of justice" given that the delay was attributable more to the petitioner's
actions than to the state's).
95. European Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(1), reprinted in supra note 38; Soering, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (para. 103). But cf. de Mayer, J., concurring, id. at 41-42. (Judge
de Mayer was of the opinion that the imposition of the death penalty in time of peace was a
breach per se of the European Convention's right to life. Judge de Mayer determined that
capital punishment was not consistent with the present state of European civilization and that the
second sentence of article 2(1), was "overridden by the development of legal conscience and
practice.")
96. Protocol No. 6, supra note 29.
97. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (para. 103).
98. Id. at 31-32 (paras. 102-104).
99. Protocol No. 6, supra note 29, art. 3, 22 I.L.M at 539, provides, "No derogation from
the provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention." Article 15
of the European Convention allows for the derogation of certain rights in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. European Convention, supra note 8, art.
15
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death penalty"tu with an optional reservation that allows retention for
military offenses.'' After Soering was decided, the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands held that the Netherlands' would breach its obligations under
article 1 of Protocol No. 6 if it surrendered a fugitive when the death penalty
may result." In that case, the court also determined that the Netherlands
was simultaneously obligated to hand over the fugitive to United States
authorities 3 by operation of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.' °4
It resolved the conflict by employing a balancing test: "The interest of the
fugitive not to be put to death takes precedence over the interest of the State
to fulfill its obligations under the NATO Status Treaty."" ° Thus, the high
court of the Netherlands concluded that the law of extradition was incorporat-
ed into article 1 of Protocol No. 6, and its importance was deemed to
outweigh the express obligations arising from a conflicting treaty of
15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
100. Protocol No. 6, supra note 29, art. 1, 22 I.L.M. at 539, provides: "The death penalty
shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed."
101. Protocol No. 6, supra note 29, art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 539, provides: "A State may make
provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of
imminent threat of war.... "
102. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1990, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [highest court] (Neth.),
translated in Leonard H.W. van Sandick, The Netherlands: Opinion of the Advocaat-Generaal
and Supreme Court Decision in the Netherlands v. Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375, 1388 (para. 3.3)(1990). See generally Major John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Major Steven J. Lepper, International
Decisions: Short v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 698 (1991). Charles
Short, a United States sergeant stationed in the Netherlands, murdered his Turkish wife in March
1988. Parkerson, supra at 699. Dutch military police apprehended Short and obtained a
confession. Id. Handing American military personnel over to American military authorities
would have been the proper procedure to follow pursuant to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. Id. at 700. However, since the military police were aware that Short would be a
candidate for the death penalty under the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, they
sought guidance from higher authorities prior to releasing him to the Americans. Id. A District
Court subsequently ordered the Dutch Secretary State of Justice to negotiate a guarantee from
the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed on Short as a precondition to
extradition, van Sandick, supra at 1388 (para. 1.1).
The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Air Forces in Europe refused to give
assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed on Short, citing policy and legal reasons.
Parkerson, supra at 702. (Parkerson noted that the United States has more troops deployed
overseas than any other nation, and that the "thread" that holds the "far flung force together is
military discipline-discipline that can be enforced only through the Uniform Code of Military
Justice." Id.) Eventually the Dutch Criminal courts found that jurisdiction to prosecute was
lacking and the Civil courts refused to allow Short to be handed over to the Americans. Id. at
700.
103. van Sandick, supra note 102, at 1388-89 (para. 3.1).
104. Agreement Relating to the Stationing of Armed Forces, Aug. 13, 1954, U.S.-Neth.,
para. 3, 6 U.S.T. 103 annex.
105. van Sandick, supra note 102, at 1389 (para. 3.5). But cf. Gomez v. U.S. District
Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992). The state of California's "strong interest in proceeding with itsjudgment [to execute]" outweighed Robert Alton Harris' interest in manipulating the justice
system. Id. The Court did not recognize Harris' interest in avoiding death by a possibly cruel
and unusual procedure (i.e., death by cyanide gas asphyxiation), nor did it address the merits
of the claim of cruel and unusual punishment. The case was allowed to proceed on the merits
in Federal District Court after Harris' execution where it was held that death by cyanide gas
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Fierro v.
Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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substantial importance to the Netherlands."
Although the Court relied on Soering, the legality of the method of the
execution as imposed in the United States (e.g., the threat of death-row-
phenomenon) was not considered by the court in reaching its decision.
Today, most State Parties that accept the jurisdiction of the European Court
are also parties to Optional Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention. 10
Since the Netherlands's decision, States that are parties to Protocol No. 6
have routinely refused extradition requests that do not provide adequate
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed. 08
In light of the above, the Soering decision can be interpreted as
providing a new source of control over a State's discretion to extradite. The
European Court determined that the European Convention is the source of
substantive and procedural rights for persons in extradition proceedings in
States that are parties to the European Convention. Specifically, the
European Convention provides that persons in extradition proceedings are
guaranteed relief from extradition if there is a real risk that they will be
subjected to treatment in another jurisdiction that amounts to torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This relief consists of the
withholding of extradition until adequate assurances are obtained from the
requesting State that the person will not be subject to such treatment. It is
probable that relief could also be granted in the form of honoring a
competing extradition request from a State where there is not a real risk of
106. In the aftermath of the Court's decision, the American prosecutors determined that the
elements of capital-murder did not exist and requested custody of Short for a non-capital murder
trial. Parkerson, supra note 102, at 702. This request was granted. Id. Parkerson described
this as a "dangerous precedent," and a "threat to the administration of U.S. military justice
overseas." Id. at 699-702.
If the American request had not been issued nor granted, Short would have been released
by the Netherlands. This would have resulted because the high Court upheld the District Court
decision which determined that the Netherlands criminal courts lacked jurisdiction. Short's
release would have been compelled because the high Court did not remand the case back to the
Criminal Courts for a redetermination of that matter. See van Sandick, supra note 102, at 1389
(para. 4).
107. The following States have become parties to Protocol No. 6 as of Jan. 1, 1994:
Austria, Slovakia Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland. Those States that have signed but not ratified Protocol No. 6 include
Belgium, Estonia, Greece, and Slovenia. Those Counsel of Europe States that have not signed
the protocol include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 15
HUM. RTS. L.J. 51, 56 (1994); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 1994 351 (1993).
108. See Denmark Refuses to Extradite Egyptian 'Terrorist, " Agence France Presse, Mar.
3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Denmark's Justice Minister Erling
Olsen told the parliament that Denmark could not extradite political refugee Talat Fouad Kassam
because it was a signatory to international conventions outlawing the extradition of suspects who
faced the death penalty at home. Kassam was sentenced to death in absentia for treason, armed
attacks, and possession of weapons. See also, Murder Suspect Extradited From France Arrives
in Texas, Agence France Presse, Nov. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. Joy Davis Aylor was extradited from France to Texas after U.S. federal and Texas
authorities gave adequate assurances that she would not be executed.
17
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the person receiving improper treatment. Implicit in the Court's decision is
the right of a person in extradition proceedings to have the opportunity to
present evidence that the person would be subjected to this prohibited
treatment. Further, the Court's decision implicitly compels the harboring
State to consider that evidence when deciding whether to extradite.
B. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee has been slow to incorporate the law of
extradition into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("Covenant")." °  The Committee recognized the possibility of incorpo-
rating extradition into various provisions of the Covenant in K.C. v.
Canada.10  There, the Superior Court of Quebec, Canada, ordered
"K.C.," a citizen of the United States, to be extradited to the United States
pursuant to a U.S. request and to the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty.'
Canada was a party to the Covenant, and the Human Rights Committee had
jurisdiction to consider K.C.'s petition because Canada was a party to the
Covenant's First Optional Protocol."'
Although Canada had abolished the death penalty (except for certain
military offenses) in 1976," 3 the Canadian court ordered K.C.'s extradition
without obtaining assurances from the United States that the death penalty
would not be imposed." 4  One issue presented before the Committee was
whether Canada, in deciding to extradite the American applicant without
109. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9. The Human Rights
Committee was established by article 28 of the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee
reviews the implementation of the rights recognized in the Covenant. The Committee's
functions are specified in articles 28 to 43 and in article 45 of the Covenant. Id., 58 Fed. Reg.
45934, 45938-40, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179-84.
110. K.C. v. Canada, Communication No. 468/1992, Decision on admissibility of July 29,
1992, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 352 (1992).
111. Id. at 352-53 (paras. I to 2.2); U.S.-Can. Extradition Treaty, supra note 23, art. 6,
27 U.S.T. at 989, provides:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not
permit such punishment for that offence, extradition may be refused unless the
requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State considers sufficient
that the death penalty shall not be imposed or, if imposed, shall not be executed.
112. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS
AT 31 DECEMBER 1993 at 124, 158, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.11
(1994). (First) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
done at New York, on Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The object and purpose of the First
Optional Protocol is to allow individual persons who claim to be victims of violations of the
rights set forth in the Covenant to submit communications to the Human Rights Committee for
consideration. Id., art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 302.
113. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779, 792 (1991) (Sopinka, J.,
dissenting).
114. K.C., 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 353 (para. 2.2).
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assurances, breached article 6 junto 261 5 because the United States
allegedly impose death sentences in a way which discriminates against black
people." 6  The second issue was whether Canada breached article 7117
because the applicant would be exposed to death-row-phenomenon." 8
Although the Canadian Supreme Court had recently held that Canada
could extradite death-eligible fugitives" 9 without assurances,' ° the Com-
mittee held that K.C.'s claim was inadmissible because K.C. had not ex-
hausted the available domestic remedies.'12 The Committee did recognize
the possibility of incorporating extradition into the Covenant by deciding that
K.C. could bring the issue before the Committee after exhausting local
remedies. "2
The Committee next addressed the issue of extradition and the right to
life in Kindler v. Canada."2 Joseph Kindler, a citizen of the United States,
was convicted of murder and kidnapping in Pennsylvania, and a jury
recommended the death penalty. ' 2 He escaped from detention before
formal sentencing and fled to Canada where he remained undetected for
115. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 6(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174,
provides: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
Id., art. 26, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45938, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimi-
nation to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
116. K.C., 13 HUM. RTs. L.J at 353 (para. 3).
117. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 7, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175, provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation."
118. K.C., 13 HuM. RTs. L.J at 353 (para. 3).
119. The term "death-eligible fugitive" is used in this article to describe a person that has
committed or is charged with committing a serious non-political crime in a retentionistjurisdiction, and the sentence for that crime can result in the imposition of the death penalty.
This person is still liable for prosecution or punishment and may or may not be within the
territory of the retentionist jurisdiction. Such a person would not be a refugee by the current
application of the Refugee Convention, supra note 46, art. 1.F(a), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
120. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779 (1991); Re Ng Extradition, 2
S.C.R. 858 (1991). K.C.'s communication to the Human Rights Committee was dated February
24, 1994. (K.C., 13 HUM. RTS. L.J at 352 (para. 1)).
121. K.C., 13 HUM. RTs. L.J at 353 (paras. 4, 6(a)). Specifically, the Committee adopted
Canada's observations that the applicant could have or already had availed himself of appellate
relief and could petition the Minister of Justice to seek the requested assurances.
122. Id. (para. 6(c)).
123. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993,
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993) (Kindler's application was decided to be admissible
on July 31, 1992, two days after K. C. was decided to be inadmissible).
124. Id. at 307-08 (paras. I to 2.1); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779,
794 (1991) (Cory, J., dissenting).
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several months."2 After his seizure by Canadian authorities, the Canadian
Minister of Justice chose to surrender Kindler to the United States pursuant
to the bilateral extradition treaty without seeking assurances that the death
penalty would not be imposed. 26
In 1991, the Canadian Supreme Court held that it was not a violation of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 27 nor a violation of Cana-
da's international obligations 2 ' to send Kindler back to the United States
without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. 129
Kindler was released to United States marshalls the same day, despite a
request by Kindler's lawyers to stay the release pending a determination by
the Human Rights Committee. 3°
A divided Committee held that Canada did not breach any Covenant
obligations by releasing Kindler without obtaining assurances and without
waiting for a determination by the Committee.' 3 ' Several Covenant articles
were alleged to be breached, but many of them were summarily dismissed
as there were inadequate facts alleged to support a claim of breach.3 2 The
Committee's decision was bifurcated between two issues: whether the
Committee had jurisdiction to render a decision,' and whether Canada
breached its Covenant obligations when it extradited Kindler without
obtaining assurances that the death penalty would not be sought or carried
out. 34
The Committee took an aggressive stance on the incorporation of the law
125. Kindler, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 308 (para. 2.1); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), 2 S.C.R. at 794 (Cory, J., dissenting).
126. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 308 (para. 2.3); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), 2 S.C.R. at 796 (Cory, J., dissenting).
127. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), sees. 7, 12.
128. The dissenting opinion of Cory, J, referred to Canada's accession to the United Nations
Charter, its vote in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its accession to the
Covenant and its (First) Optional Protocol, its accession to the Torture Convention, its vote in
favor of a United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution affirming the goal of abolition
of capital punishment, and Canada's vote in favor of the Covenant's Second Optional Protocol.
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. at 807-09 (Cory, J., dissenting). The
judgment of La Forest, J., noted that these instruments collectively fall short of establishing the
abolition of the death penalty as an international norm. Id. at 833-34. La Forest, J., observed
that the U.S.-Can. Extradition Treaty, like the U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, clearly
contemplates the possibility of unconditional extradition under such circumstances as those found
in Kindler's case. Id.
129. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779 (1991) (Plurality, 4 - 3). See
generally, William A. Schabas, International Decisions, Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice),
Re Ng Extradition, 87 AM. J. INT'L. 128 (1993).
130. Kindler, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 308-314 (paras. 2.4, 17).
131. Id. at 314 (para. 18).
132. For example, Kindler, who is white, alleged that the United States capital sentencing
system was racially biased, but did not substantiate how the bias would have affected him. Id.
at 308 (para. 3).
133. Id. at 309-10 (paras. 6.1 to 7).
134. Id. at 310-14 (paras. 8.1 to 18).
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of extradition into the Covenant, although it did not phrase the issue in terms
of incorporation. The Committee discussed its earlier determination of the
admissibility of Kindler's communication. 35  There, the Committee
determined that it was clear that the travaux prdparatoires'36 revealed that
article 13 was not intended to detract from normal extradition arrange-
ments. 37 Article 13 provides procedural rights relating to the expulsion
of aliens who are lawfully within the territory of a State Party.'38 Despite
the clear absence of extradition considerations from this or any other article
of the Covenant, the Committee observed that "whether an alien is required
to leave the territory through expulsion or extradition, the general guarantees
of article 13 in principle apply, as do the requirements of the Covenant as a
whole."1 39 In support of this conclusion, the Committee noted that Canada
had already allowed Kindler to avail himself of the Canadian courts,
including the Supreme Court of Canada."4 The Committee thus incorpo-
rated elements of extradition law into the Covenant by extending the Cove-
nant's procedural and substantive rights to aliens'4' that are unlawfully in
the territory of a State Party and are subject to expulsion. 42 This holding
should encourage refugees and asylum applicants in a Covenant State Party
to petition for Covenant-derived protections should the Refugee Convention
135. Id. at 309 (para. 6.6).
136. Travaux priparatoires is a term of art that refers to the preparatory work of a treaty,
and is like a legislative history. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, arts. 31-33, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-93 (1969),
63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 875, 885-86 (1969) (law governing the interpretation of treaties).
137. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 309 (para. 6.6).
138. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 13, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45938, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176,
provides:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may
be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law
and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be
allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by,
and be presented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or
persons especially designated by the competent authority.
139. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 309 (para. 6.6) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. This decision was not unanimous: two members of the Committee believed that the
existence of other extradition conventions precluded the Committee from admitting any requests
to review extradition cases except in exceptional circumstances. Id., app. A, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J.
at 315 (Opinions of Mr. Herndl and Mr. Sadi). These Committee members hypothesized that
an exceptional circumstance would arise if there was an arbitrary extradition to a country where
there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be subjected to torture. Id.
142. The class of aliens that are unlawfully in the territory of a State Party and are subject
to expulsion is larger than the class of persons subject to extradition. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1)(B), which provides for the deportation of the class of aliens that (unlawfully)
entered the territory of the United States without inspection.
21
Roecks: xtradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When ations Mu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
210 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
fail to provide sufficient protection from expulsion or return ("refoule-
ment"). 143
In its discussion of the merits, the Committee first acknowledged that,
[i]f a State Party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances
such, that as a result there is a real riskl'4 that his or her rights under the
Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State Party itself may
be in violation of the Covenant." 45
In assessing whether the death-row-phenomenon associated with capital
punishment constitutes a breach of article 7, the Committee reaffirmed its
earlier decisions that "prolongued judicial proceedings do not per se
constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, even if they can be a
source of mental strain for the convicted person."" It also noted that
"prolonged periods of detention under a strict custodial regime on death row
could not necessarily be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing himself of
143. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 46, art. 1(F)(b), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156,
which provides that fugitives from prosecution of serious non-political crimes are not afforded
the protections of the Refugee Convention. See also, REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at
36 (para. 155), which suggests that, in this context, a serious crime is a capital crime or very
grave punishable act. In applying this exclusion clause, the State employs a balancing test
between the nature of the offense committed and the degree of persecution feared. Id. at 36-37
(paras. 154-156). It is possible that there will be instances where the application of the
balancing test would result in an expulsion or return which is permissible by the Refugee
Convention but impermissible by the substantive guarantees of the Covenant.
See also Refugee Convention, supra note 46, art. 33, reprinted in supra note 48, which
allows for the expulsion or return ("refoulement") of a refugee even if that person's life or
freedom would be threatened if that person, after having been convicted of a particularly serious
crime in the harboring State, constitutes a danger to the community of his country of refuge.
Article 33 has been given force in the United States through operation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This statute provides for the non-discretionary
withholding of deportation for aliens whose life or freedom would be threatened in the country
to which they would be returned on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. This withholding of deportation is not available to
aliens that have been convicted of an "aggravated felony" in the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2). The definition of "aggravated felony" was recently expanded to include certain
theft offenses, child pornography offenses, fraud offenses, tax offenses, commercial alien
smuggling offenses, and other nonviolent crimes. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305. Once deportability
is established in evidentiary proceedings, the alien is precluded from presenting evidence of any
prospectively harmful treatment in the designated country of deportation. Matter of K--, I. &
N. Int. Dec. 3163 (1991), see also 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(c) and 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)(4) (1994)
(administrative regulations governing evidentiary proceedings conducted by Immigration Judges
in deportation and exclusion proceedings, respectively); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) and § 208.24(b)(3)
(1994) (administrative regulations governing evidentiary proceedings conducted by Asylum
Officers); IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY TECHNICAL CORRECTIONs ACT OF 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305 (enables a federal district court to order deportation at the
time of criminal sentencing).
144. The Committee defined a "real risk" as a "necessary and foreseeable consequence."
Kindler, 14 HuM. RIS. L.J. at 313 (para. 14.1(a)).
145. Id. at 313 (para. 13.2).
146. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309 (para. 6.4) (quoting Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan
v. Jamaica, para. 13.6, Communication Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987, Apr. 6, 1989).
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appellate remedies."' 47  The Committee observed that "the facts and
circumstances of each case need to be examined" in any article 7 analy-
Si.141sis.l
In evaluating whether the imposition of capital punishment violates
article 7, the Committee articulated a new test. The Committee noted that
it would consider the relevant personal factors regarding the victim, the
specific conditions on death row, and whether the proposed method of
execution is particularly abhorrent. 49 The Committee then distinguished
Kindler's case from that of the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights in Soering.5 ° In determining that Canada did not breach article 7,
the Committee noted that the facts differed as to the age and mental state of
the offender,' noted the absence of evidence submitted that describe
Pennsylvania prison conditions, noted the lack of evidence which would
indicate the effects of the prospective post-sentence detention, and noted the
absence of a simultaneous extradition request by an abolition State. 5 2
Kindler also argued that Canada breached its obligations under article 6,
paragraph 1,1'1 when it extradited him to the United States. Specifically,
he argued that since Canada had abolished capital punishment, article 6
required Canada to refrain from doing indirectly what it could not do di-
rectly." He further argued that article 6, paragraph 2,15 only applies
to countries that have not abolished the death penalty. 56
The Committee rejected Kindler's argument that article 6 prohibited
Canada from indirectly implementing capital punishment through extradi-
tion "'57 by noting that Canada was not a party to the Second Optional
147. Id. (citing Randolph Barrett & Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, Communications Nos.
270/1988 and 271/1988 (1992), para. 8.4).
148. Id. at 314 (para. 15.2). Covenant, supra note 9, art. 7, reprinted in supra note 117,
provides in relevant part that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
149. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 314 (para. 15.3).
150. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
151. Kindler was approximately twenty two years old at the time of his conviction and was
thirty years old at the time of his extradition. He did not allege to be suffering from any adverse
mental state. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 307 (paras. I to 2.1).
152. Id. at 314 (para. 15.3).
153. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 6(1), reprinted in supra note 115, provides in relevant part
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life."
154. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 312 (para. 10.1).
155. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 6(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174,
provides in relevant part that "sentence[s] of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant .....
156. Id.
157. However, five of its eighteen members believed Canada was in breach of the right to
life provision when it extradited Kindler under the theory that once a State Party abolished the
death penalty, article 6 prohibits that party from reintroducing it through the process of
extradition. Kindler, apps. B to F, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 316-23 (Opinions of Mr. Wennergren,
Mr. Lallah, Mr. Pocar, Ms. Chanet, and Mr. Urbina).
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Protocol, which expressly prohibits a State from implementing the death
penalty.' The Committee observed that Canada's general abolition of
capital punishment did not release Canada of its obligations under extradition
treaties.' 59 The Committee merely observed that, "it is in principle to be
expected that . . a State which has itself abandoned capital punishment
would give serious consideration to its own chosen policy" when deciding
whether or not to seek assurances that capital punishment will not be imposed
as a condition to extradition."6  In light of the Committee's recognition
that a State Party may be in violation of the Covenant if it extradites a person
to another jurisdiction and in light of the Committee's reliance on the fact
that Canada is not a party to the Second Optional Protocol, it appears likely
that the Human Rights Committee would hold that the Second Optional
Protocol imposes an obligation on State Parties to prohibit extradition when
there is a real risk that the death penalty would be imposed.
The Committee hypothesized that had Kindler been exposed, through
extradition, to a real risk of a violation of the Convention's article 6,
paragraph 2,161 in the United States, Canada would have violated its
obligations under article 6, paragraph 1.162 However, the Committee con-
cluded that there was not a breach in this instance because Kindler did not
allege that he received an unfair trial in Pennsylvania. 63  Thus, the
Committee could not find that he would be arbitrarily deprived of his life in
Pennsylvania. The Committee also hypothesized that Canada would have
breached article 6 had Canada decided to send Kindler to the United States
arbitrarily or summarily," 6 but there was no breach because Kindler
enjoyed extensive proceedings in the Canadian Courts. 65
158. Second Optional Protocol, supra note 29, art. 1(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1467, provides: "No
one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed." This
protection is to apply as an additional provision of the Covenant, is subject to individual petition
to the Human Rights Committee through the First Optional Protocol, and is non-derogable. Id.,
arts. 5, 6, 29 I.L.M. at 1468.
159. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 314 (para. 14.5).
160. Id.
161. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 6(2), reprinted in supra note 155.
162. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314 (para. 14.3):
If Mr. Kindler had been exposed, through extradition from Canada, to a real risk of
violation of article 6, paragraph 2, in the United States, that would have entailed a
violation by Canada of its obligations under article 6, paragraph 1. Among the
requirements of article 6, paragraph 2, is that capital punishment be imposed only for
the most serious crimes, in circumstances not contrary to the Covenant and other
instruments, and that it be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. . . . The author has not claimed . . that the conduct of the trial
in the Pennsylvania court violated his rights to a fair hearing under article 14 of the
Covenant.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 314 (para. 14.6).
165. Id. at 314 (para. 14.4).
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No Committee members were of the opinion that the Covenant's article
6 right to life provision prohibits executions. The Human Rights Committee
reasoned that the Covenant's prohibition against torture must be read in light
of the provisions of article 6, which enumerate permissible applications of
the death penalty. 'I However, the Committee held out the possibility of
eventually finding the death penalty incompatible with the prohibition against
torture when it noted "the evolution of international law and the trend
towards abolition, as illustrated by the adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly of the Second Optional Protocol[.]J 1 67
Lastly, the Committee expressed regret that Canada expelled Kindler
after it had received a request to stay that action by the Special Rappor-
teur.168  Only one member took the view that Canada breached arti-
cle 26169 for expelling the applicant with the knowledge that a communica-
tion had been submitted to the Committee.7 0
A few months later the Committee held in Ng v. Canada that Canada
had breached its Covenant obligations when it extradited Charles Ng, a
British subject born in Hong Kong, to the United States without obtaining
assurances that the death penalty would not be carried out.'7 Charles Ng
was accused of kidnapping, torturing, and killing at least twelve people in a
horrific manner." There was substantial evidence of Ng's identity and of
his premeditation.'73 The amount of evidence and the severity of the crime
make it very probable that Ng will be sentenced to death in California.' 74
Like Kindler, one issue in Ng was whether a State Party is in violation
of article 7 of the Covenant when it extradites a person within its jurisdiction
and there is a real risk that the person would be subjected to torture, cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in another jurisdiction. 75
However, Charles Ng's case was different than Joseph Kindler's because Ng
166. Id. at 314 (para. 15.1) (capital punishment carried out within the parameters of article
6, paragraph 2, does not constitute a breach per se of the article 7 prohibition against torture);
see generally, id. at 314 (para. 14.5) (noting that Canada is not a party to the Covenant's Second
Optional Protocol).
167. Id. at 314 (para. 14.2).
168. Id. at 314 (para. 17). A Special Rapporteur is a single individual of recognized
international standing. United Nations Special Rapporteurs perform a variety of tasks, including
studying and reporting human rights problems, receiving complaints about past or impending
human rights violations, and issuing appeals to governments.
169. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 26, supra note 115, establishes the equal protection of the
law.
170. Kindler, app. F, para. 24, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 323 (Opinion of Mr. Urbina).
171. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991
(Views adopted on Nov. 5, 1993).
172. Id. at para. 2.1.
173. See Dan Morain, Canada Sends Accused Killer Ng Back to U.S., L.A. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1991 (at the time of extradition, police had gathered 2,000 pieces of evidence, including torn
pieces of clothing, jewelry and a grisly video tape of a woman being sexually attacked).
174. Ng at para. 11.7. Ng has not undergone a trial nor sentencing as of the date of
publication.
175. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 7, reprinted in supra note 117; Ng at para. 16.1.
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was extradited to California on capital charges pending trial,'76 whereas
Kindler had been convicted of a capital offense and had fled from the United
States immediately before formal sentencing." 7 Also, at the time of all of
Ng's Canadian proceedings, California's sole method of execution was death
by cyanide gas asphyxiation,178 whereas at the time of all of Kindler's
Canadian proceedings, Pennsylvania's method of execution was death by
lethal injection.
The Committee began its analysis of whether the imposition of capital
punishment violates article 7 by restating the test articulated in Kindler: it
would consider the relevant personal factors regarding the victim, the specific
conditions on death row, and whether the proposed method of execution is
particularly abhorrent."s However, unlike Kindler, the Committee did not
then discuss the former two factors but instead elaborated on the last factor.
It noted that, when imposing capital punishment, the execution of the
sentence "must be carried out in such a way as to cause the least possible
physical and mental suffering." l81 The Committee noted the uncontested
assertion that death by cyanide gas asphyxiation may cause prolonged
suffering and agony which may take over ten minutes,"n and decided that
such a method of execution would not meet its test of "least possible physical
and mental suffering."" 3  Thus, the Committee concluded that Canada
breached its Covenant obligations when it extradited Ng without receiving
adequate assurances that he would not be executed by cyanide gas.'I
One significant aspect of the Ng decision was the lack of consideration
the Committee afforded to the "safe-haven" argument in its analysis of
176. Ng at para. 13.5.
177. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
178. California amended its statutes in 1992 to allow the convict to choose between death
by cyanide gas asphyxiation and death by lethal injection. Death by cyanide gas asphyxiation
will be imposed if a convict refuses to choose. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(b) (Deering 1994)
("If a person under sentence of death does not choose either lethal gas or lethal injection, .
the penalty of death shall be imposed by lethal gas.")
179. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 311 (para. 9.7).
180. Ng at para. 16.1.
181. Id. at para. 16.2 (quoting the Committee's General Comment 20[44] on article 7 of the
Covenant (CCPR/C/21/Add.3, para. 3)).
182. Id. at para. 16.3; Telephone Interview with Don W. MacLeod, Canadian counsel for
Charles Ng (Feb. 3, 1994). Mr. MacLeod emphasized the importance of an affidavit by an
eyewitness to the Robert Alton Harris execution, Mr. Russell Stetler. Mr. Stetler wrote in a
declaration for a related domestic trial: "I watched his head as it circled, bobbed and jerked,
fell forward and then slowly reared back. Harris moaned, strained against the straps, convulsed
repeatedly, and flushed as his heart pumped poisoned blood. Six or more times Harris seemed
dead, only to return to life and suffer before our eyes again." Richard Barbieri, Death Knell
For the Gas Chamber?, THE RECORDER, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1.
183. Ng at para. 16.4.
184. Id.
[Vol. 25
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capital punishment." The Committee's approach was more aggressive
than the Soering Court's finding of a breach of article 3 of the European
Convention. In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights tied its
finding of a breach to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to
the existence of alternative means of achieving the legitimate purposes of
extradition, and to the recognition that a State's becoming a safe-haven to
fugitives is a threat to the receiving nation and tends to undermine the
foundations of extradition.'I6
In contrast to the Soering Court, the Human Rights Committee
disregarded the threat posed to Canada in becoming a safe-haven for
fugitives. Although there is dubious evidence to support Canada's con-
cerns,1' 7 its concerns remain very real. Entry into Canada from America
is much easier than was access to the abolition States of Europe at the time
of the Soering decision."s There is a 4,800 kilometer unguarded border
between Canada and the United States with vast expanses of territory where
a fugitive could enter Canada without inspection."8 9 The Committee none-
theless excluded the safe-haven argument from its analysis.
Since the Ng decision requires the requested State to determine if a
fugitive faces a "real risk" of treatment in contravention of the Covenant in
185. The policy against establishing a "safe-haven" was one of the reasons the Canadian
Supreme Court allowed the extradition of Kindler and Ng to proceed without assurances. The
other reasons were that abolition was not yet a norm of international law, the Canadian Charter
did not proscribe the death penalty, and the legislature proscribed the death penalty for
Canadians but did not mandate that extradition of a non-Canadian fugitive be conditioned on the
receipt of assurances. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. at 782.
186. See supra text accompanying note 76.
187. Canada asserted that the number of fugitives entering Canadian territory had been
steadily increasing in the last twelve years. Ng at para. 8.8. Canada alleged that there were 29
extradition requests from the United States in 1980 but by 1992 that figure had increased to 88.
Id. Canada's further asserted that "[r]equests involving death penalty cases are a new and
growing problem for Canada . . . ." Id. (quoting Canada's submission).
Ng, through counsel, raised substantial doubt about the validity of the inferences from
those statistics. Ng noted that the number of extradition requests from the United States in 1991
was 17. Id. para. 11.3. Ng attributed the large increase the next year to an amendment to the
Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty to the effect that, inter alia, taxation offenses became
extraditable and ambiguities regarding double jeopardy and reciprocity were removed. Id.
Further, Ng noted that since the time of the adoption of the U.S.-Can. Extradition Treaty, the
Canadian Minister of Justice had been called upon to make no more than three decisions on
whether or not to ask for assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed or
implemented. Id.
188. Soering was decided by the European Court of Human Rights on July 9, 1989. The
access points to the European State Parties that were abolition States were severely restricted at
that time: the Berlin Wall (and the rest of the "iron curtain") was still in existence, so most
abolition State Parties were then isolated from retentionist States by the "iron curtain" (a
guarded border) and the surrounding seas and oceans. Serge Schmemann, Clamor in the East:
East Germany Opens Frontier to the West for Migration or Travel, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1989,
at Al. The Berlin Wall "fell" on November 9, 1989. Id. Thus, the access points to these
States at the time of the Soering decision were limited in number (e.g., airport terminals and
shipyards) and were routinely subject to inspection by the States' immigration agencies. This
isolation put a severe burden on fugitives attempting to enter those States without inspection or
detection by local immigration agencies.
189. Ng at para. 8.8.
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the requesting State, there flows from this another significant aspect of the
Ng and Kindler decisions: the Covenant obligates the harboring State to
assess the requesting State's penal system in order to determine its compli-
ance with Covenant provisions.
These decisions effectively obligate every State Party to become a human
rights forum, where grievances against the penal systems of other States can
be assessed by Covenant State Parties. 19° In comparison, this is a poten-
tially heavier burden on States than that imposed by the Refugee Convention
when a State is assessing the existence of "persecution.""'' There, the
competent authorities of the harboring State are not called upon to pass
judgment on conditions in the applicant's country of origin, but the
authorities are merely required to have a knowledge of the conditions of the
applicant's country of origin in order to assess the credibility of the
applicant's claim of persecution.'9
IV. FUTURE CLAIMS CHALLENGING EXTRADITION REQUESTS
A. Anticipated Guidelines for Determining What Will Amount to
Impermissible Treatment in the Requesting State
The Human Rights treaties mentioned above have been extended to
prohibit the extradition of a person when there is some degree of likelihood
that the fugitive will experience harmful treatment in the requesting State.
If this harmful treatment were perpetrated by actors of the harboring State,
it would constitute a violation of a non-derogable 93 treaty right. For
example, the European Court of Human Rights held that the extradition of
Soering would expose him to death-row-phenomenon;' death row phe-
nomenon is violative of European Convention article 3, a non-derogable
190. The obligation to assess whether there is a real risk that the person will be subjected
to Covenant-proscribed treatment is not necessarily limited to alleged violations of article 6 or
article 7, nor is the inquiry limited to death-eligible fugitives. The Kindler and Ng decisions
imply that a State Party is obligated to consider whether there is a real risk that the person will
be subjected to any treatment in contravention of the Covenant. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J.
at 313 (para. 13.2) (see supra text accompanying note 145); Ng at para. 14.2. Thus, a black
fugitive who has fled from a State where he is wanted for a non-capital drug-related offense
could challenge the decision to extradite based on an allegation that the requesting State's drug
related penal code is implemented with a racial bias that is in contravention of article 26. See
generally, Sam Vincent Meddis, Is The Drug War Racist?: Disparities Suggest the Answer is
Yes, USA TODAY, July 23, 1993, at IA (even though the majority of drug traffickers are white,
blacks are more likely to be arrested for drug related crimes).
191. Refugee Convention, supra note 46. In order to comply with the article 33 prohibition
of expulsion or return ("refoulement") of refugees, States must determine whether a person is
a refugee within the meaning of article 1. See id., arts. 1, 33, reprinted in supra note 48.
Suggested procedures for the determination of refugee status are elaborated in the Refugee
Handbook. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 45-49 (paras. 189-205).
192. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 46, 12-13 (para. 42) (1979).
193. See supra note 84.
194. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 35 (para. 111).
[Vol. 25
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right. 195 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that extraditing a
fugitive when he may subsequently be sentenced to death was a violation of
article 1 of Protocol No. 6; '9 this paragraph, which provides that no one
shall be sentenced to death, is a non-derogable right."9 The Human Rights
Committee stated that there would have been a violation if Kindler had been
executed in a manner inconsistent with the right to life provisions in
Covenant article 6;198 article 6 is a non-derogable right.' 99 The Human
Rights Committee held that the extradition of Ng was a violation because it
was foreseeable that he would be executed in a manner inconsistent with
Covenant article 7;"° article 7 is a non-derogable right."
In light of these decisions, it is possible to foresee which substantive
rights will be afforded to persons in future extradition proceedings. It
appears that persons in extradition proceedings are protected from expulsion
if they would endure treatment which would amount to a violation of a non-
derogable treaty right in the requesting State. Other non-derogable rights
include freedom from slavery and servitude;' freedom from the sentence
of death for crimes committed by persons that are below eighteen years of
age; 3 freedom from being subjected to medical or scientific experimenta-
tion without free consent;' freedom from imprisonment for inability to
fulfill contractual obligations; s freedom from prosecution of ex post facto
criminal offenses;' and the freedoms of thought, conscience, and reli-
gion.' Finally, the Covenant prohibits the derogation of any right if that
derogation involves "discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion, or social origin. "
However, the procedural rights that these treaties afford to persons in
extradition proceedings appear to be derogable in time of war or public
emergency. That is, if there is a public emergency in the harboring State,
195. European Convention, supra note 8, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
196. van Sandick, supra note 102, at 1389 (para. 3.3).
197. Protocol No. 6, supra note 29, art. 3, reprinted in supra note 99.
198. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 314 (para. 14.3), supra note 162.
199. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
200. Ng at para. 16.4.
201. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
202. See, e.g., Covenant, supra note 9, art. 8(l), 2, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45936, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 175 (by operation of art. 4(2)); European Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(1), 213 U.N.T.S.
at 224, by operation of art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. Note, however, that these treaties allow
States to impose sentences of hard labor as a lawful form of punishment for crimes, regardless
of the existence of a public emergency.
203. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 6(5), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175 (by
operation of art. 4(2)).
204. Id., art. 7, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.S.T. at 175 (by operation of art. 4(2)).
205. Id., art. 11, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45936, 999 U.S.T. at 176 (by operation of art. 4(2)).
206. Id., art. 15, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45937, 999 U.S.T. at 177 (by operation of art. 4(2)).
207. Id., art. 18, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45937, 999 U.S.T. at 178 (by operation of art. 4(2)).
208. Id., art. 4(1), 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.S.T. at 174.
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it is likely that the harboring State can permissibly exercise its discretion to
extradite in an arbitrary and summary manner. This conclusion is substanti-
ated by the Human Rights Committee's decision in Kindler, where the
Committee determined that its jurisdiction to render its decision was rooted
in the procedural rights embodied in Covenant article 13,20 a derogable
right. 10 The procedural rights appear to be derogable in the European
Convention system because some procedural rights afforded to persons in
extradition or deportation proceedings in the European Convention are
derogable.2 '
The following two divisions of this part of the comment will analyze the
attributes of the United States capital sentencing practices that may be
subject to adjudication in extradition proceedings where the United States is
requesting a fugitive for prosecution of a capital crime.
B. Extradition to the United States Would Result
in Impermissible Death-Row-Phenomenon
As noted earlier, the European Court of Human Rights formulated a
narrow definition of when the extradition of a person facing a real risk of
experiencing death-row-phenomenon would constitute a breach of the
European Convention's article 3.212 The Court has not decided a case
which reaffirms or redefines its narrow formulation of death row phenome-
non since that decision, as abolitionist State Parties that are not parties to the
relevant Protocols have routinely refused to grant extradition requests or have
withheld extradition until adequate assurances have been received. 3  In
209. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309 (para. 6.6).
210. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 13, reprinted in supra note 138. Article 13 is derogable
by implication because it is not included in the article 4 list of non-derogable treaty provisions.
211. European Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(1)(O, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226, provides for
the deprivation of liberty of persons "with a view to deportation or extradition," provided that
the deprivation is "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law." This right against
arbitrary arrest is derogable. Id. art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
212. See supra text accompanying note 76.
213. See, e.g., Portugal's treatment of Yeung Yuk-leung. Yeung Yuk-leung was in the
custody of Macau authorities and the People's Republic of China requested his extradition for
charges of murder. Macau Sends Man Back to Murder Trial, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Hong
Kong), Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. An official with a
Chinese news agency proffered assurances that he would not be executed in China, but the next
day the official publicly denied that he had made those assurances. Id. The Macau High Court
permitted his extradition to the People's Republic of China to face charges for capital murder
after the Macau High Court obtained assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.
Id.
After receiving notice from Mr. Pedro Redinha, Yeung Yuk-leung's counsel, the European
Commission requested the Portuguese authorities to halt Yeung Yuk-leung's imminent surrender
pending the Commission's examination of the matter. European Rights Commission Stops
Macao's Move to Extradite Dissidents, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 11, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. The Constitutional Court of Lisbon blocked
the extradition pending an evaluation of the matter. Portuguese Court Blocks Extradition From
Macau to China, REuTERS WORLD SERV., July 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File. The extradition is still enjoined pending an assessment by the Supreme Court of
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light of the uniformity of State practice and the evidence of opinio juris, 214
it is likely that the Court would eliminate all elements of the Soering holding
from consideration other than the duration of post-sentencing detention. That
is, it would not consider age, mental state, etc. to be relevant to finding a
breach of article 3.
The Human Rights Committee has been more hostile to article 7 claims
of death-row-phenomenon. The Committee recognizes that death-row-
phenomenon could theoretically amount to a breach of article 7, but would
disregard those delays caused by the applicant seeking appellate review. 215
In determining the existence of a such a breach, the Committee would
examine the relevant personal factors about the person (including the
existence of an extradition request from an abolition party), the conditions
on death row, and whether the proposed method of execution is "particularly
abhorrent. 216
Since the Committee operates under the penumbra of the United Nations,
the Committee would likely grow less hostile to an alleged breach of the
Covenant caused by death-row-phenomenon once the doctrine begins to
crystallize into customary international law. There have been recent high
court decisions in this area.
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe recently had occasion to survey the
jurisprudence of the British Commonwealth countries and of the United
States with respect to the issue.21 That court was confronted with a group
of claims from sentenced individuals who had their appeals properly
dismissed but had been awaiting their executions for periods ranging from
nineteen to fifty-two months .218 No date was ever established for their
executions, and the sentences could be carried out on any arbitrary day
without prior notice.2 9
After comparing the international jurisprudence, the Court held that the
treatment amounted to death-row-phenomenon and was a violation' of the
Zimbabwe constitution, which provides that "[no] person shall be subjected
Lisbon as of the date of publication.
214. See, e.g., Earl Pratt and Another v. Attorney-General for Jamaica and Another, [1994]
2 App. Cas. 1 (1993), reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 338 (1993) (Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, London, held in appellate review that post-sentencing detention in excess of five
years without more constitutes death-row-phenomenon that is inhuman or degrading punishment
or treatment).
215. Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, para. 8.4, Communication Nos. 270/1988 and
271/1988 (1992); Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 309 (para. 6.4). Contra Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), where death row phenomenon was found likely
to occur even though the delay would be caused by the convict's use of the appellate process.
216. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 314 (para. 15.3).
217. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 323 (1993).
218. Id. at 324.
219. Id. at 324-25.
220. Id. at 336.
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to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treat-
ment.""' Although the post-sentencing delay was caused by the govern-
ment and not by the convicts' use of the appellate process, the opinion
concluded with an observation that the result would have been the same if the
delay was solely attributable to the applicant's use of appellate review.m
It determined that the mental anguish that would arise would be offensive to
the Constitution regardless of the source of the delay.' The court ordered
the death sentences vacated 24
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, London, has recently
formulated a bright line rule that post-sentencing detention exceeding five
years constitutes inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.' The
Privy Council is the highest appellate court of the Commonwealth and is
composed of jurists from several member States.' In the consolidated
cases under review, the post-sentencing delay was caused by both the
government of Jamaica and by the applicants.' However, the opinion
concluded that the result would be the same if the five year delay was solely
attributable to the applicants' use of judicial process.'
Prior to reaching the Privy Council, the applicants had lodged communi-
cations with both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and with
the Human Rights Committee. 9 The Commission rejected the submission
of unfair trial proceedings but recommended sentence commutation for
humanitarian reasons ." The Human Rights Committee held in a seminal
ruling that prolonged judicial proceedings do not constitute a breach per se
of article 7, and that delays caused by the applicant's use of appellant
procedures will not substantiate a claim." The Privy Council's opposing
ruling on the same issue that was presented to the Human Rights Committee
221. ZIMB. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1990), ch. Ell (The Declaration of Rights), sec. 15(1).
222. Catholic Commission, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 335.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 337.
225. Pratt v. Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. at 35.
226. The decisions of the Privy Counsel are the governing precedent to all Commonwealth
States that recognize the Privy Counsel's right of appeal. Many States have terminated the right
of appeal to the Privy Council, including Canada, India, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Thus, the Privy
Council's holding will be persuasive but not binding on Canada and these other States when the
issue is presented in extradition cases. Pratt v. Jamaica, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 338 (publisher's
comments).
227. Pratt v. Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. at 22.
228. Id. at 35.
229. Id. at 22.
230. Id. at 22 (the petition was rejected on Oct. 3, 1984).
231. Pratt, Robinson and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 223/1987,
225/1987 (Apr. 6, 1989) (this decision was issued three months after the European Commission
found death-row-phenomenon in Soering and was issued three months before the European Court
found a breach in Soering). The Committee did find a breach of article 7 on the grounds that
a ten hour delay in reporting a stay of an imminent execution caused needless anguish. The
Privy Council believed that the Committee's decision was based on uncontroverted but erroneous
facts that the Committee assumed to be true. Pratt v. Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. at 25-26.
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by the same applicants illustrates the controversial nature of claims involving
"death-row-phenomenon." Like the Human Rights Committee, the Privy
Council decides human rights issues for many abolitionist and retentionist
States. Should the Human Rights Committee persist in adhering to its
jurisprudence, it appears that it will be increasingly isolated in its treatment
of this issue.
C. Racially Disparate Capital Sentencing Practices
Considered To Be A Breach Of International Law
1. International Human Rights Norms
Article 26 of the Covenant provides that "[a]ll persons are ... entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
color ... or other status. "2 While this article is theoretically derogable
in time of public emergency, the article that permits derogation of some
rights is conditioned so that derogation is prohibited if involves "discrimina-
tion solely on the ground of race . . . ." This right to equal protection
of the law is included in several other United Nations instruments and
regional conventions' and has been recognized as a jus cogens norm of
international law."
232. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 26, reprinted in supra note 115.
233. Id., art. 4, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45935, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
234. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 1(3) (purpose of United Nations includes
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race"); Charter of the Organization of American States, done at Bogata,
Apr. 30, 1948, art. 5(j), 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2418, 119 U.N.T.S 3, 54 ("The American States
proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed
or sex"); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 24, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 151
("All persons ... are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law");
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, done at New
York, on Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 ("right to equal treatment before the
tribunals and all other organs administering justice"); European Convention, supra note 8, art,
14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 ("the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ... race, colour .... [or]
association with a national minority. . . ."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 A (111), U.N. GAOR, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("All ... are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration"); and American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, art. II, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of
American States (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. LIV/I.4 Rev. (1965) ("All persons are
equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without
distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor").
235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987). Ajus cogens norm of
international law "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 136, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. These
international norms are also known as peremptory norms of general international law. Id.
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The importance of the right to equal protection of the law was demon-
strated by its explicit incorporation into the United Nations Model Treaty on
Extradition. 6 It provides that "[extradition] shall not be granted . . . if
the requested State has substantial grounds for believing . . . that that
person's position may be prejudiced [on account of that person's race]."237
The Inter-American Convention on Extradition includes a similar provi-
sion. 238
In light of the treatment that "equal protection" has been afforded in
international instruments, a court or treaty organization would likely hold that
a harboring State cannot extradite a fugitive if there is a real risk that the
fugitive will encounter unequal protection of the law in the requesting State
and that unequal protection will result in severe consequences for the person.
Due to the heightened attention afforded the death penalty by internation-
al organizations 9 and the restrictions that States have imposed on the
implementation of the death penalty,' it is highly probable that various
human rights treaties would obligate a harboring State to refuse to extradite
236. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 17.
237. Id., art. 3, 30 I.L.M. at 1411-12, provides:
Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances:
(b) If the requested State has substantial grounds for believing
that the request for extradition has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions, sex or status, or
that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons;
(f) If the person whose extradition is requested has been or
would be subjected in the requesting State to torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment or if that person has not
received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal
proceedings, as contained in the [Covenant], article 14[.]
238. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, supra note 17, art. 4(5), 20 I.L.M. at 724,
provides: "Extradition shall not be granted [when], from the circumstances of the case, it can
be inferred that persecution for reasons of race, religion or nationality is involved, or that the
position of the person sought may be prejudiced for any of these reasons."
239. Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty,
E.S.C. Res. 1984/50 (with Annex), reprinted in 1984 U.N.Y.B. 709-10 [hereinafter ECOSOC
Res. 1984/50] (endorsed by U.N.G.A. Res. 39/118); Report of the Human Rights Committee,
1982 U.N. Doc. A/37/40, 93-94. General comment 6(16) d/(article 6), paragraph 6:
[Covenant article 6] refers generally to abolition in terms which strongly suggest
(paras. 2(2) and (6)) that abolition is desirable. The Committee concludes that all
measures of abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right
to life within the meaning of article 40, and should as such be reported to the
Committee. The Committee notes that a number of States have already abolished the
death penalty or suspended its application. Nevertheless, States' reports show that
progress made towards abolishing or limiting the application of the death penalty is
quite inadequate.
See also treaties cited supra note 29.
240. See treaties cited supra note 29.
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a person when there is a real risk that the person would suffer from unequal
protection of capital sentencing in the requesting State. In support of this
conclusion, the United States Supreme Court once stated that the imposition
of a severer punishment on a slave than on a free person for the same offense
was an "incident" of slavery."'
2. Capital Sentencing Practices in the United States
Statistical evidence tends to prove that the capital sentencing system in
the United States is implemented in a racially discriminatory manner against
black persons. The United States Department of Justice reported that, by the
end of 1992, 59% of those under the sentence of death were white while
40% were black.2 During this same period the black population in the
United States was only about 12%.23 A recent report released by former
U.S. Representative Don Edwards focused on the prosecution of the federal
"drug kingpin" law2" and revealed that of those cases in which the death
penalty was sought, 78% were black defendants, although approximately
75% of all (capital and non-capital) drug trafficking convicts were white.5
There is also statistical evidence of a "race of victim" bias in the
nation's capital sentencing system.2' After surveying twenty eight studies
published by non-governmental organizations, the United States Congress'
General Accounting Office concluded in 1990 that those who murdered
whites were found more likely to be sentenced to death than those who
241. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883), provides:
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very distinct
notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents. Compulsory service
of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his movements except by the
master's will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in
court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities,
were the inseparable incidents of the institution. Severer punishments for crimes were
imposed on the slave than on free persons guilty of the same offences .... (emphasis
added).
242. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1992 1 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter BJS BULLETIN].
243. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITrEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 103 Cong.,
2d Sess., REPORT ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS, 1988-
1994 6 (1994) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (The report was prepared for Rep. Don Edwards by
the majority staff of the subcommittee and was not reviewed or approved by other members of
the subcommittee).
244. 21 U.S.C.S. § 848(e)-(q) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
245. STAFF REPORT, supra note 243, at 2 (referring to U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 6, Table 10 (convictions 1987-90)
(1993)).
246. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5, reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. S8271-
73 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (report to the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary).
35
Roecks: Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Mu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
224 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
murdered blacks.' The "race of victim" influence was consistent in all
States analyzed and was found at all stages of the criminal justice sys-
tem.' This bias emerged strongest in the prosecutorial discretion to
charge a defendant with a capital offense and to proceed to trial rather than
plea bargain.249 A subsequent survey by a non-governmental organization
revealed that 84% of the victims in death penalty murder cases were white
even though 50% of all murder victims were black.' °
3. The State of Law in the United States
The United States Supreme Court was first confronted with the issue of
racial discrimination in its capital sentencing practice in McCleskey v.
Kemp. 5' A black defendant who was convicted of killing a white police-
man presented as evidence a comprehensive statistical study of the sentencing
system in Georgia. 52  The study took into account some 230 nonracial
factors which might legitimately influence a sentencer, and revealed that
juries were more likely to spare a defendant's life if the victim was
black. 53 The study further demonstrated that blacks who kill whites were
sentenced to death "at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and
more than 7 times the rate of whites who kill blacks. "2
The McCleskey Court assumed the study to be accurate for the purpose
of reaching a judgment. 5  The Court held the evidence was not sufficient
to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution 56
because the study did not show that the defendant received an unfair tri-
al."' In order for the appellant to show that he had suffered unconstitu-
tional discrimination, he would have to prove that the "decisionmakers in his
case acted with [a racially] discriminatory purpose."I s' Also, since
"discretion is essential to the criminal justice process," the Court "[de-
manded] exceptionally clear proof" for a determination that the discretion
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2
(1993).
251. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
252. Id. at 286.
253. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 292 n.7.
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
257. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
258. Id. No convict in the United States has ever successfully challenged their death
sentence by proving a "discriminatory purpose" existed in prosecutorial discretion. But cf.
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that disparate impact
theory of discrimination is critical to eradication of discrimination and in developing
opportunities for minorities and women), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985).
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had been abused. 2 9 The statistical study was held not to be "exceptionally
clear proof."2' Arguably, the Court implied that the study would be
admissible evidence and that a less stringent test for discrimination would be
adopted if Congress passed requisite legislation." No convict has ever
met the McCleskey standard of proof, and Congress has refused to pass the
requisite legislation even though it has been proposed several times.2
4. The Inter-American System
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 3 was presented
259. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
260. Id.
261. In determining that the statistical evidence used in support of the McCleskey Equal
Protection claim was insufficient to support an inference that the decisionmakers in McCleskey's
case acted with discriminatory purpose, the Court distinguished McCleskey's case from cases
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, where statistical evidence is accepted as proof
of discriminatory intent. See id. at 292-97. The Court noted that an important difference
between the cases in which it had accepted statistics as proof of discriminatory intent and the
McCleskey case was that, in Title VII contexts, the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain
the statistical disparity. Id. at 296. In McCleskey, the State had "no practical opportunity to
rebut the" study. Id. The Court's reasoning and its references to past Congressional legislation
arguably amount to an implication that the Court would place greater weight on statistical studies
if Congress promulgated legislation which specifically allowed the States an opportunity to rebut
the studies.
262. See, e.g., Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), which would
have enabled "the use of [statistical] evidence showing a consistent pattern of racially biased
sentences in death penalty cases." Letter from U.S. Representative Don Edwards, Vice
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, to Craig Roecks, Staff Writer, California Western Law
Review (Mar. 25, 1994) (on file with the California Western Law Review). The legislation
would have invalidated sentences on a showing that the race of the defendant and/or victim was
a "statistically significant factor" in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty. H.R. 4017
§ 2921(b). Such a showing would have established a rebuttable presumption against the
government. Id. § 2921(e). Each case would presumably have been tried on a county-by-county
basis by individual defendants. This might not have provided relief to minority convicts who
were improperly sentenced in a county with a small population of convicts because it may not
have been possible to conduct a statistically reliable study in a small county.
Similar legislation has been consistently proposed in the United States House of Representa-
tives and Senate since 1988. Proponents of the bills (including Prof. David Baldus, the co-
author of the study used in McCleskey) stated that the permitted studies would supplement
individualized allegations and denied that the bill would mandate quotas or would mandate the
de facto abolition of the death penalty. 137 Cong. Rec. S8273-74 (daily ed. June 20, 1991).
Leading opposition members (e.g., Sen. J. Helms) stated that the bill would remove the
individualized treatment afforded every defendant, would mandate quotas, and would provide
for the de facto abolition of the death penalty in the several states. 137 Cong. Rec. S8671,
S8676 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
263. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was established by the Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, done at Buenos Aires, Feb.
27, 1967, art. 112, 21 U.S.T. 607, 691, Pan-Am. T.S. IA. The Inter-American Commission's
functions, competence, and procedures are established in Chapter VII of the American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, arts. 34-51, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 153-57. Its main
function is "to promote respect for and defense of human rights." Id., art. 41, 1144 U.N.T.S.
at 154. Any State that is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and any
person or organization within an OAS member State may lodge petitions with the Inter-American
Commission that allege violations of the American Convention on Human Rights. Id., art. 44,
1144 U.N.T.S. at 155. The Inter-American Commission and States that are parties to the
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with a claim by a United States convict that essentially challenged the
McCleskey ruling.' In that case, Willie Celestine, a black United States
citizen, was tried and executed in Louisiana for the rape and murder of an
elderly white woman.' A central issue was whether Celestine's treatment
by the Louisiana criminal justice system was racially discriminatory such that
the United States breached its obligations under articles I and II of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.' Celestine's
evidence consisted of two statistical surveys similar to those presented to the
United States Supreme Court in McCleskey. 67 Celestine also challenged
the Supreme Court's exclusion of statistical evidence and the Court's dis-
criminatory-purpose standard.' Celestine did not challenge the death
penalty as a breach per se of the right to life established in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, probably because that issue was
resolved in previous decisions.'
Had Celestine established a prima facie case, the United States would
have had the burden to prove that their sentencing system was not racially
discriminatory.27 The Commission implicitly acknowledged that when
there is a prima facie allegation that a State has breached a norm of jus
cogens, the burden of proof shifts to the State to establish that there has not
been a breach. 2" The Commission was willing to acknowledge that equal
protection is a norm of jus cogens, but was persuaded by the United States'
argument that "[a]n entire criminal justice system cannot be proved invalid
by mere citations to statistical studies without more."rn The Commission
concluded that statistical evidence alone was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case. 3  The Commission observed that even if statistical evidence
American Convention on Human Rights have the right to submit cases to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights for final judgment. Id., arts. 61, 67, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159-160. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established by the Chapter VIII of the American
Convention on Human Rights. Id., arts. 52-69, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157-60.
264. Celestine v. United States, Case No. 10031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 292 (1989).
265. Id. at 292.
266. Id.; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 243, art. I
("Every human being has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person"); Id., art. 1I,
supra note 243 (provides that all persons are equal before the law).
267. Celestine, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 296.
268. Id. at 296-98.
269. See Riley v. Jamaica, Case No. 3102, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 89 (1981), where the
Commission held that the American Convention on Human Rights does not prohibit the death
penalty. The Commission has consistently followed this determination and has consistently
recommended the Government of Jamaica to suspend executions, commute death sentences, and
to consider the abolition of the death penalty. See, e.g., Cuthbert v. Jamaica, Case No. 9190,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 60 (1986). Note that there is an optional protocol aimed at the abolition of
the death penalty. ACHR Protocol, supra note 29.
270. See Celestine, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 312.
271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting Government's brief). Note, however, that Celestine was challenging
Louisiana's capital sentencing practices, not an "entire criminal justice system."
273. Id at 312.
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were somehow sufficient, Celestine's case wasn't necessarily supported by
the statistics presented because the applicant was convicted and sentenced by
a unanimous jury that contained several black members, the applicant
perpetrated a particularly heinous crime, and this very case had already been
reviewed for racial bias by the Louisiana Supreme Court.274 Since a prima
facie claim did not exist, the Commission did not address the propriety of the
McCleskey discriminatory-purpose standard. 5
It is difficult to foresee how the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights276 would decide the
case of a black fugitive challenging extradition to the United States. Neither
body has published a decision in at least ten years which discusses
extradition and its place in the regional human rights instruments.
5. The Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee has received and will likely continue to
receive communications from persons alleging that they should not be
extradited from a State Party to the United States because the United States'
capital sentencing system is implemented in a racially discriminatory manner
against black persons. 2' Each person claimed that the State Party's
decision to extradite without receiving adequate assurances contravened
Covenant article 26. 2 1
The first published decision was K.C. v. Canada.279 There, the
communication was inadmissible due to the applicant's failure to exhaust
domestic remedies.' The Committee decided that K.C. could reapply
274. Id at 310-12.
275. Id. It is possible that the Commission could reconsider this holding by noting the
special consideration that has been given to the death penalty subsequent to Celestine. Soon
after Celestine was decided, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty was approved by the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States and the Second Optional Protocol was approved by the United Nations General
Assembly. See treaties cited supra note 29. The special attention afforded capital punishment
by the international community is evidence of its unique character. By noting the unique
character of capital punishment, the Commission could entertain statistical studies of the racial
disparities in the requesting State's capital sentencing system without opening the door to
invalidating a State's "entire criminal justice system" by a statistical study.
276. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is established by Chapter VII of the
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, arts. 52-69, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157-60.
Only the States Parties and the Commission have the right to submit a case to the Court. Id.,
art. 61, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159.
277. K.C. v. Canada, Communication No. 468/1992, Decision on admissibility of July 29,
1992, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 352 (1992); Kindler v. Canada, Communication No.
470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993), and Ng
v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1993).
278. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 26, reprinted supra note 115.
279. K.C. v. Canada, Communication No. 468/1992, Decision on admissibility of July 29,
1992, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 352 (1992).
280. Id. at 353 (paras. 5.3 to 6(a)).
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after exhausting his domestic remedies.281 Unfortunately, it is difficult to
assess the strength of the claim because the decision did not state the
ethnicity of the applicant.
The issue was next addressed in Kindler' 2 and Ng,2  respectively.
Kindler, who was white, failed to state how the alleged racial disparities in
the United States' sentencing system would affect him.' Ng's allegations
of alleged racial disparities were noted but otherwise ignored by the
Committee, possibly because a breach was found on other grounds .285
If an equal protection claim is presented by a person in extradition
proceedings and if that claim is ignored by the requested State, then the
Committee would probably decide the case on the merits. 2 However, it
is unlikely that a requested State would ignore the claim because the practice
of the Human Rights Committee has been to assume as true those claims that'
are well attested but unrebutted by the State Party. 2 Thus, if a requested
State were to acquiesce, the State would be at risk of an adverse decision by
the Committee.
281. Id. at 353 (para. 6(c))
282. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993,
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993).
283. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991
(1993).
284. Kindler, 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. at 308 (para. 3).
285. See Loveless v. Canada, para. 18, Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/I (1981) ("[In view of this finding [a breach of article 27], the Committee does
not consider it necessary to examine whether the same facts also show separate breaches of the
other rights involved").
286. See, e.g., Ng. There, the Human Rights Committee decided the merits of the claim
that death by cyanide gas asphyxiation amounted to a breach of Covenant article 7, even though
"the judgments of the Supreme Court in Canada did not in any detail discuss the evidence
pertaining to ... execution by cyanide gas, although [Ng] presented evidence ... to the
Court." Id. para. 11.11.
287. Blier v. Uruguay, para. 11.2, Doc. A/37/40, reprinted in DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 149 (1991), provides:
It is implicit in article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol that the State party has the duty
to investigate in good faith all allegations of violation of the Covenant made against
it and its authorities, especially when such allegations are corroborated by evidence
submitted by the author of the communication, and to furnish the Committee the
information available to it. In cases where the author has submitted to the Committee
allegations supported by substantial witness testimony, as in this case, and where
further clarification of the case depends on information exclusively in the hands of
the State party, the Committee may consider such allegations as substantiated in the
absence of satisfactory evidence and explanations to the contrary submitted by the
State party.
It should be noted that the Committee may be unwilling to impose this burden of proof on
the harboring State because that State does not have the relevant information about the requesting
State exclusively within its control. However, the Committee may request the relevant
information from the requesting State by operation of the State reporting system if the requesting
State is a party to the Covenant, and the Committee may impose this burden of proof onto the
requesting State in order to formulate a decision about the communication. See supra note 291
and accompanying text.
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It is possible to foresee how the Committee would assess an equal
protection communication if it were submitted by a black person whose
extradition is sought by the United States for a capital offense. The
Committee has requested States to provide statistical studies and has relied
on those studies in reaching decisions." The Committee may be less
reluctant to request Canada to initiate a study of the American capital
sentencing system due to the widely available and comprehensive reports that
have been published or adopted by the United States government. 289 It
could then consider the claimed breach of article 26 of the Covenant on the
merits of the communication.'l Claims of reporting bias could be avoided
if the State Party or the petitioner were to rely on those United States
government reports that tabulate racial and non-racial factors in sentencing.
Alternatively, the Committee may use the information it receives directly
from the United States government through the State reporting system to
assess the merits of the equal protection claim. 29'
288. See Loveless paras. 8(a), 9.2. The Committee found the State Party in breach of
Covenant article 27.
289. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 246; BJS BULLETIN, supra note 242; STAFF
REPORT, supra note 243.
290. As of July 1992, the Committee had not decided a case on the merits which alleged that
a breach of article 26 arose from the imposition of facially neutral legislation which resulted in
racially disparate effects. The leading cases involving article 26 have dealt with express
legislative distinctions. The Committee evaluated those legislative distinctions and found a
breach when the legislative discrimination was not based on "reasonable and objective criteria."
Broeks v. Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, reprinted in MCGOLDRICK, supra note
287, at 165, and Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984, reprinted in
MCGOLDRICK, supra at 165, 9 HuM. RTs. L.J. 256-59 (1988) (breach because unemployment
benefits were allocated differently between married men and married women); see also, Danning
v. Netherlands, Communication No. 180/1984, reprinted in MCGOLDRICK, supra at 165,
9 HUM. RTs. L.J. 259-60 (1988) (no breach when unemployment benefits were allocated
differently between unmarried cohabitants and married cohabitants because unmarried cohabitants
are not subject to "the full extent of the duties and obligations incumbent on married couples.");
Stalla Costa v. Uruguay, Communication No. 198/1985, reprinted in 9 HUM. RTS. L.J. 261-262
(1988) (no breach because distinctions were promulgated to remedy victims of past breaches of
article 25 of the Covenant).
The Committee published General Comment 18/37 on Non-Discrimination in 1989 which
developed in general terms the principles enunciated in these cases. Manfred Nowak, The
Activities of the UN-Hwnan Rights Committee: Developments from 1 August 1989 through 31
July 1992, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 11-12 (1993). The Committee first noted the explicit non-
discrimination provisions articulated in Covenant articles 2, 3, 4, 14, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26.
The Committee then defined "discrimination" as implying any distinction, exclusion, restriction,
or preference based on any ground listed in those articles which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
footing, of all rights and freedoms. Id. The Committee stated that article 26 "prohibits
discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities." Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting the Committee).
291. Article 40 of the Covenant provides that State Parties are obligated to submit reports
as requested by the Committee. These reports describe the measures the States have adopted
which give effect to rights contained in the Covenant and on the progress made in the enjoyment
of those rights. Covenant, supra note 9, art. 40, 58 Fed. Reg. at 45939, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
The United States submitted its first report in September, 1994. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PUB.
No. 10200, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: INITIAL REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1994). See supra note 287 for
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If the Committee were to decide that Covenant article 26 is breached
because a State Party grants an extradition request without seeking assurances
when there is a real risk that the fugitive would be subjected to racially
discriminatory sentencing in the United States, then every State Party to the
Covenant would be obligated to become a "safe-haven" for certain death-
eligible black fugitives wanted in the United States.2" Safe-haven States
would be obligated to withhold extradition until adequate assurances are
obtained from the United States. Such a condition would continue until the
United States corrected its practice through federal common law or through
the implementation of remedial legislation.
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Blackmun recently
concluded that the United States' capital sentencing system, as currently
administered, violates the U.S. Constitution because it is unfair and fraught
with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.293 In his con-
cluding remarks, he stated:
Perhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or verbal
formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in
a capital-sentencing scheme. I am not optimistic that such a day will
come. I am much more optimistic, though, that this Court eventually will
conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness
"in the infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and the
death penalty-must be abandoned altogether ... "21
In light of the substantial evidence of racially disparate sentencing
practices combined with the lack of remedial measures, it is probable that the
Human Rights Committee or another body will eventually conclude that
extradition to face the death penalty in the United States amounts to a breach
of article 26 (or like protections from racially prejudicial treatment). If
a discussion of the consequences of failing to respond to an alleged breach.
292. A similar analysis would apply to a finding of gender discrimination against men in
capital sentencing. Such a finding would turn State Parties into safe havens for all male death-
eligible fugitives. For claims involving gender discrimination that were denied by United States
courts by following the reasoning of McCleskey, see, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473,
1490-91 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds 493 U.S. 1051 (1990) (unsuccessful gender
discrimination claim based on statistical evidence that showed that there were no female convicts
on Arizona's death row, although approximately 10% of homicide convicts were female); Harris
v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1375 (9th Cir. 1989) (same as Richmond, but here there were no
female convicts sentenced to death in California during a four year period, although 4.3% of
homicide convicts were female).
293. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be
imposed fairly, and-with reasonable consistency, or not at all, and, despite the effort
of the states and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this
daunting challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimina-
tion, caprice, and mistake. . . . (citation omitted).
294. Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1138 (alteration in original) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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Justice Blackmun was correct, it is likely that no United States imposed
remedy short of abolition will permit the body to reverse its finding.
V. IMPLICATIONS
There is a global trend toward the abolition of the death penalty, and
States have recognized abolition to be an aspect of international human rights
law. The recent incorporation of the "law of extradition" into human rights
treaty law appears to be a by-product of the trend toward abolition.
Abolition States that are parties to human rights conventions and
abolition protocols are burdened with formidable obligations: to become
safe-havens for a class of potentially violent fugitives and to experience
diplomatic tension with a requesting State that desires to impose the death
penalty.
States that are parties to the conventions but are not parties to the
abolition protocols are burdened with a different dilemma: either scrutinize
the requesting State's criminal justice practices or become a safe-haven to
every death-eligible fugitive. Harboring States that choose the former will
experience heightened diplomatic tension with the requesting State. Harbor-
ing States that choose the latter will likely receive an increased number of
fugitives.
Harboring States that choose to scrutinize each fugitive's claim create the
risk that each claim could result in an international incident. Since each
fugitive has an incentive to challenge the practices of the requesting State in
the compulsory extradition proceedings, the harboring State would be
obligated to determine if the requesting State's criminal justice system is
defective and, if so, to become a safe-haven to all similarly situated fugitives
from those requesting States.29 This will occur with increasing regularity
as the trend toward abolition continues. This trend has already been
characterized by a tightening of the procedural guarantees afforded death-
eligible persons, by expanding the scope of inhuman-treatment protections,
by expanding the class of persons who are immune from the death penal-
ty' % and may include application of equal protection restrictions if future
challenges are successful. Each extradition request that is refused based on
one of these general categories would be a source of heightened diplomatic
tension and each refusal could become a well publicized incident in each
State.
295. For example, today all Covenant State Parties must become a safe-haven for fugitives
from Maryland (which mandates death by cyanide gas asphyxiation as the sole means of
execution) and possibly from Arizona (which allows death by cyanide gas asphyxiation and death
by lethal injection). It is possible that all State Parties will become safe-havens for all black
fugitives from the United States, from Florida, or from Bay County, Florida. If the latter, every
retentionist county in America has the potential of being put on trial in a State Party's
administrative proceedings.
296. See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1984/50 § 3, supra note 239 (prohibiting the execution of
retarded persons, juvenile offenders, new mothers, and pregnant women).
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The primary reason that a State Party would choose to become a safe-
haven for selective categories of death-eligible fugitives as opposed to
becoming a safe-haven for all such fugitives is the desire to avoid receiving
increased numbers of death-eligible fugitives. If a State were to become a
safe-haven for all death-eligible fugitives, the number of fugitives that a State
receives would increase as knowledge of that State's policy disseminated to
the class of death-eligible persons who have avoided arrest but are physically
present in retentionist States. However, even if a State were to rigidly
adhere to a selective expulsion schedule, the number of fugitives received
would probably increase because unsophisticated persons would be prone to
flee based on an incomplete understanding of the law or based on a poorly
communicated rumor. It is therefore difficult to foresee whether the selective
safe-haven policy would have a significant deterrent effect on fugitives when
compared to becoming a safe-haven for all death-eligible fugitives. On
balance, a State wishing to comply with its international human rights
obligations would probably find it more desirable to become a safe-haven for
all death-eligible fugitives as opposed to the alternative's high comparative
diplomatic costs29 and low comparative deterrent value.
The availability of safe-haven States will have a secondary effect in
retentionist States. While the impact on public opinion and State government
practice is difficult to foresee, other events are reasonably foreseeable. An
"underground railroad" could develop in retentionist States comprised of one
or more of the following: a toll-free telephone service offered by foreign
non-governmental organizations; a religious organization's well publicized
policy to offer confidential advice, shelter or transportation to fugitives;
individual attorneys who may accept the risks of counseling a client to flee;
or a clandestine market in smuggling fugitives. It is also foreseeable that the
stress on safe-haven States could induce them to actively encourage
retentionist States to abolish the death penalty, conceivably through economic
or other dealings298 with the retentionist State.
It is likely that the treaty-based organizations will use the State reporting
system2' to further the trend toward the abolition of the death penalty.
For example, the United States will likely endure close scrutiny from the
297. Consider a comparison between two possible scenarios. In the first, Canada refuses
the surrender of all fugitives unless it obtains assurances that the death penalty will not be
imposed because Canada has abolished the death penalty as a matter of public policy. In the
second, Canada refuses to surrender black fugitives to Georgia unless it obtains assurances
because Canada made a factual determination that Georgia's capital sentencing system is a form
of racial discrimination in violation of a jus cogens norm of international law. The former
scenario would probably result in substantially less diplomatic tension than the latter.
298. A State could conceivably pay for an educational advertising campaign in a retentionistjurisdiction. This could be done on a State's own initiative or could be a remedy imposed by
a treaty-based organization pursuant to a finding of a State's breach of a convention.
299. See supra note 291.
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Human Rights Committee for expanding its use of the death penalty, 3 °
executing juvenile offenders 30' and mentally retarded persons, 302 and
using apparently racially disparate sentencing and execution practices a03
VI. CONCLUSION
The European Convention and the Covenant have now been interpreted
as a source of procedural and substantive rights for a person in extradition
proceedings in a State Party. The procedural rights that these treaties
provide appear to be derogable in time of war or public emergency. The
enjoyment of these procedural and substantive rights operate to impose limits
on a State's discretion to extradite a person.
States that are parties to the European Convention and the Covenant are
now obligated to refrain from extraditing a person when there is a real risk
that the person will experience treatment which would amount to a violation
of a few specific non-derogable treaty rights in the requesting State. Thus
far, those treaty rights include the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment, although there is a lack of uniformity
over what constitutes such treatment. Another non-derogable treaty right
which provides absolute protection from the death penalty is the obligation
to abolish the death penalty when the harboring State is a party to an
abolition treaty. Finally, the non-derogable provisions in the right to life
against arbitrary and summary executions provide absolute protection from
the death penalty. It is probable that these discretionary controls will also be
applied when a fugitive challenges an extradition order and proves that there
is a real risk that the person will receive treatment that is violative of some
other non-derogable right, as well.
For example, it is probable that States that are parties to any one of
several human rights treaties will be found to be obligated to refuse to send
300. In 1994, the federal government added dozens of offenses that are punishable by death.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 60001-
60026, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82 (1994). In addition, the number of death sentences announced
and the number of executions carried out in federal and state jurisdictions has been increasing
in the years since the death penalty's reintroduction in 1976. BJS BULLETIN, supra note 242.
Contra, the Human Rights Committee's General comments 6(16), supra note 239, which call
for a reduction in the number of death eligible offenses and call for a reduction in the sentencing
and carrying out of the death penalty.
301. The United States executes persons for crimes committed at the age of sixteen.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1991). Contra Roach
& Pinkerton v. United States, Case No. 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 345(1987) (the application of the death penalty on juvenile offenders decided to be a breach of ajus
cogens norm of international law by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
302. See, e.g., ECOSOC Res. 1984/50 § 3, supra note 239, which provides: "Persons
below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to
death, nor shall the death sentence be carried out on pregnant women, or on new mothers, or
on persons who have become insane." But cf. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)(allowing the execution of mentally retarded persons).
303. See discussion supra part IV. C.
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black fugitives to the United States to be executed if the current capital-
sentencing practices in the United States are determined to violate the non-
derogable prohibitions against racial discrimination.3t0
Finally, these present and prospective extradition obligations create
foreign relations incentives for States that have presently abolished the death
penalty to choose to accede to human rights treaties which obligate signatory
states to abolish the death penalty.
Today's fugitives will gain absolute protection from the death penalty if
it crystallizes into a breach per se of the right to life.3" Should that occur,
all harboring States will be obligated to refuse to extradite fugitives when
there is a real risk that the death penalty will be imposed in the requesting
State.
Craig R. Roecks"
304. Id.
305. For a discussion of the use of death penalty as a breach per se of the international right
to life, see Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779, 807-810, 829-830 (1991)
(Cory, J., dissenting); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41-42 (1989)
(de Mayer, J., concurring); and SCHABAS, supra note 24. For a discussion of the abolition of
the death penalty in general terms, see Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 314-74 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R.
779, 799-807 (1991) (Cory, J., dissenting).
* Special thanks to Professor Howard R. Berman for his encouragement, to Donna Lee
Schubert for her patience, and especially to Rachel A. Smith for her editing assistance.
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